Expanding NATO: A Retrospective Analysis

Here we consider the moves made by the United States in the mid-late 1990s with regard to the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. Viewed from the vantage point of history, it is easy to forget how contentious and divisive this idea was. In many ways, the move would be the most lasting contribution of the Clinton Administration...

Since its earliest years, Idealism and Realism have profoundly influenced American foreign policy. Each has dominated for a season, before being replaced, in what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has called, “The Cycles of American History.”[i] Whilst initially appearing to be mutually exclusive, they are often woven together in an intricate and contradictory manner, to produce official US foreign policy positions. In addition to idealism and realism, a long tradition of isolationism has dominated American strategic thought, from the time of George Washington, through to the Twentieth Century. With the outbreak of the Cold War, this policy of non-engagement was replaced by one of internationalism. Clearly, this represented a profound shift in national policy, and a break from nearly two hundred years of American thinking. This dissertation concerns the United States, her position in the world and specifically about her relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I will attempt to discern how the aforementioned philosophies of international behaviour affect American relations with NATO, and moves to expand NATO into Central and Eastern Europe.

Here we consider the moves made by the United States in the mid-late 1990s with regard to the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. Viewed from the vantage point of history, it is easy to forget how contentious and divisive this idea was. In many ways, the move would be the most lasting contribution of the Clinton Administration.

Critics have argued that Nato's selective admission will introduce discrimination against those states that are not accepted.[ii] Others have argued that current NATO boundaries are outdated and that “it makes no sense to perpetuate these positions by excluding the newly democratic states of Central Europe.”[iii] U.S. President Bill Clinton has made NATO expansion the centrepiece of his Administration’s foreign policy, defining it as a Marshall Plan for the Twenty-First Century. However, are American attempts to now do “for Europe's East, what the Marshall Plan did for Europe's West,” purely idealistic? Or are there more realistic motives at stake. This dissertation will attempt to demonstrate that as with most US foreign policy, the issue is not as clear-cut as may first appear.

America has always been an idealistic nation. It could be argued that America existed as an ideal, long before it existed as a nation, for the mythical land of redemption in the West has long been the subject of myth. As the Twentieth Century draws to a close it is interesting to note that the foreign policy of the most technologically advanced nation on Earth is still influenced heavily by policies and theories devised in another age. American strategic policy is influenced by two divergent theories on international politics: realism and idealism. Both theories continue to play important roles in today's world and have proved to be the basis for important decisions during this century.

Idealism can be seen as the application of standards of morality to foreign diplomacy. Idealism stresses threats to global rather than national security. Advocates of idealism support international organisations, international law, arms control, human rights, and above all, democratic government. Idealists believe in the possibility of creating a more secure, prosperous and just world order, one compatible with American values. As a result, they often hold up standards of attainment that may be unrealistic in the real world. During the Cold War the idealists sought to universalise the humanitarian ideals and moral principles to which the United States aspired. Most American foreign policy rhetoric is idealistic and such idealism is used to sell Foreign Policy to Americans and the world

Realism or realpolitik is a foreign policy based on calculations of power and national interest. It is based on Machiavellian principles of interest, prudence and expediency. The intellectual tradition of political realism rejects moralism in foreign policy and assumes instead that survival is the nation's only acceptable ethical obligation. National power is the best route to its realisation.  Realism stresses the expectation of conflict between states and the need to increase power relative to one's adversaries. Realism has been most popular when international events seemed to confirm its pessimistic assumptions. The American preoccupation with geopolitical spheres of influence and military balances, and the equation of national power with military might, derived from the assumptions of realpolitik.

To understand American use of idealism and realism, it is important to comprehend that both have their roots in the nation’s reaction to the Old World. Before becoming a great power, America engaged in a national policy of non-engagement, holding herself aloof from other countries. Such notions of American isolationism pre-date the republic, with the earliest seeds of isolationism having been sown by Thomas Paine in  ‘Common Sense.’ He declared that, “it is in the interest of America to steer clear of Europe.”[iv] George Washington’s Farewell Address enshrined the isolationist policy in the hearts of American policy makers for over one hundred years, finding ultimate expression in the Monroe Doctrine. Nineteenth Century American leaders avoided the European balance of power system, choosing instead to concentrate on the urgent task of rebuilding the nation after the Civil War.

Isolationism is an example of American foreign policy being dictated by both realistic and idealistic principles. Realistically, America was in no position to dictate terms to the Old World during the Nineteenth Century. When she had clashed with Europe, America was badly hurt, a fact highlighted by the burning of Washington DC during the War of 1812. It sees inequity between nations as an inevitable feature of international affairs. The best way to deal with other nations is to avoid them. There is also an element of idealism in the policy, of refusing to become embroiled in the old balance of power system, and of remaining ‘pure’. America attempts to portray herself as an innocent in the world collapse however when addressed with a realistic appraisal. For America was founded in invasion and conquest, established by a bloody revolution and much of its economy predicated on the enslavement of imported innocents. Undaunted, isolationism dictates idealistically that America serves its interests best by perfecting democracy at home, acting as a beacon for mankind.

Even in 1916, isolationists opposed President Wilson’s attempts “to make the world safe for democracy”[v], through American involvement in the First World War. Due in part to his moral rhetoric, American Idealism has become closely associated with President Wilson, who viewed the war a crusade to defeat evil. He thus began the tradition of portraying America as a global saviour, saving the world from the clutches of evil. This notion would come to pervade the rhetoric of American foreign policy. Whilst Wilson's intervention in the war made America a world power, he could not overcome the overriding desire for American isolationism as Congress rejected the League of Nations. The horror of battle had not been intended as a prelude to permanent European involvement and the fighting had changed few minds. As late as 1940 leading Americans remained isolationist. Congress forced a Neutrality Act on President Roosevelt to prevent him from selling arms to Britain and a Constitutional amendment was proposed which would have necessitated a public referendum before any declaration of war.

Following World War Two, the onset of the Cold War caused a profound change in American foreign policy. Isolationism was replaced by a internationalism, a policy of active involvement in foreign affairs including participation in international organisations, and other multinational arrangements. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan exemplify the shift in policy, as together they shaped the post war world. Both of these groundbreaking policies can be seen in terms of their idealistic and realistic aspects.  The Truman Doctrine was portrayed in Wilsonian terms, as an idealistic plan to create a free and democratic world, free of communist tyranny. Its realist content was to contain Communism, with no attempt at ‘rollback.’[vi] Both aspects however recognised the necessity to contain communism.

America has pursued a policy of global activism since 1945, leading a series of defensive alliances in Europe and Asia to deter communist aggression and provide for collective security. The US has exercised its dominant military and economic power in an effort to shape and influence the world. This appetite for internationalism is evident in American intervention in the political affairs of other nations and in efforts to transplant American values around the globe. Realist principles of maintaining international order through military strength and reasoned strategy gained popular support during the Cold War.  Even then however, the concept of idealism survived, with idealists seeking to universalise the moral principles to which the United States aspired.

With the end of the Cold War, the debate over isolationism and internationalism has resurfaced. In 1991, President Bush urged a Wilsonian style of world leadership following the Gulf War, when he heralded a “New World Order,”[vii] dedicated to peace, freedom, human rights, security and the rule of law. Wilsonianism also implies American leadership in world affairs, and again Bush referred to the post Gulf War era as an opportunity for America to lead the world in the direction of peace. Under the Clinton Administration, both idealistic and realistic policies are being employed. Liberal internationalists base their enthusiasm for NATO enlargement on Wilson's thinking, whilst many realists also embrace the increase in democratic states. As Henry Kissinger stated, “America must try to forge the widest possible moral consensus around a global commitment to democracy.”[viii] Realists and idealists view participatory democracy as a value on which American policy can now be centred and which also enhances national security.

The Clinton Administration has pushed for worldwide acceptance of the democratic virtues that underpin America's liberal political culture. In 1994, Henry Kissinger wrote, “all of Wilson's successors have been Wilsonian to some degree.”[ix] President Clinton has continued this tradition. His administration could not accept an isolationist agenda for it has used Internationalism to fuel domestic growth that was the bedrock of Clinton’s 1992 victory. President Clinton’s foreign policy is based on the idealist Wilsonian tradition of promoting democracy, prosperity and enhancing security. Yet he has managed to maintain a continued strong defence, consistent with realist thinking. President Clinton has remained committed to American activism, claiming that America must “fulfil our responsibility as the world's sole super-power.”[x] American foreign policy now encompasses both prudent realism and moral idealism, to protect the nation from external threats and to stand for ideals worthy of emulation. This duality accounts for Washington's ability to pursue seemingly contradictory foreign policy goals.

April 1945 was a time of great concern in Europe. President Roosevelt had died, leaving his vice president of twelve weeks, Harry Truman, as President of the United States. European fears over the Presidency of Harry Truman were heightened because America's isolationism and rejection of the League of Nations following World War One was still remembered. “The stronghold of traditional isolationism in America was the Midwest, and Truman came from Missouri.”[xi] FDR had championed an organisation of collective security, with the major wartime allies joining China to serve as the four policemen of the world. Roosevelt did not live to see his plan implemented., and many feared that his dream would die with him. Harry Truman however felt that World War Two was a direct result of American isolationism and declared, “a worse war will follow, unless the United Nations and their allies work together for peace as they are working together for victory.”[xii] With the outbreak of the Cold War however, the United Nations became another battleground between east and west. Its inability to fulfil its promise of global collective security meant that another international organisation would be needed to face the growing power of the USSR, based on the power of the United States. “Three century domination of the world by western European nation states had come to an end.”[xiii]

1947 was a turning point in US post war thinking. President Truman was advised that Britain could not continue to provide assistance to Greece and Turkey. Soviet control of these two nations would have serious implications for the global status quo. The Truman Doctrine, delivered to Congress on March 12, 1947 dedicated the United States to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted aggression by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”[xiv] Together with Secretary of State George Marshall’s plan for continental economic recovery, the Truman Doctrine lifted Western Europe from its post-war despondency.

The new American policy of aiding the cause of freedom around the world was an important step on the road toward NATO. What was needed now was an international body within which to channel this activism. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin realised that whilst America had no tradition of involvement in such entangling alliances, the security of Western Europe was dependent upon American involvement in a regional defence alliance. Europe would need to demonstrate it had changed dramatically for America to alter two hundred years of isolation. When Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed a 50-year collective defence treaty in Brussels, Truman declared, “the US will extend to the free nations the support which the situations requires.”[xv] Then Bevin announced a dramatic departure from Britain’s traditional separation from the Continent, a proposed European political community. “The covert objective of the British was nothing less than American membership of the Western Union.”[xvi]

One obstacle to this was the US State Department, where Charles Bohlen and George Kennan felt America should encourage European defence, but avoid any promise of direct involvement. “The American attitude was that of a modern day Minerva, ready to lend its shield to the good cause of European democracy, but not prepared to promise to descend into the earthy European arena and become involved should trouble occur.”[xvii]  The British Foreign Office were also convinced that the future salvation of Europe depended upon the active involvement of the United States. “Such a powerful consolidation of the West would convince the Soviets that they could advance no further,”[xviii] George Marshall wrote. Bevin's proposal gained the support of Republicans John Foster Dulles and Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, placing consideration of American participation in a European security system on a bipartisan footing from the earliest stages.

Secret talks on NATO had no clear plan “as to how the European agreement on defence should be joined by the United States.”[xix]  What was imperative was that there be no misunderstanding over the nature of the agreement. Central to the new treaty was Article 5, which declared “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”[xx] This treaty obligation however seemed to contradict the American Constitution, which reserved the right to declare war for Congress. Senator Donnell feared that America participation would commit America to fight irrespective of Congress. This would mean, “letting the European nations declare war, and letting us fight.”[xxi] The State Department also refused to endorse any commitment that would involve an automatic obligation upon America to go to war. “US constitutional processes would have to be followed and they predicted that Congress itself must decide whether the US should go to war.”[xxii] The new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson however, convinced the Senate to adapt a version of Article 5 that would be acceptable to both America and Europe. On April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and three months later, on July 21, the US Senate ratified it by 82 votes to 12. The signing was a radical transformation in American foreign policy. NATO represented a sharp break with isolationism, practised to all intense and purposes since Washington’s farewell address warned against ‘entangling alliances’.[xxiii]

Since its inception, NATO has served to discourage a Soviet military assault on Western Europe, using the combined conventional forces of its European members and the US nuclear deterrent. The organisation is also a forum for regular consultation on political, economic and other non-military issues. NATO is organised into three components. The North Atlantic Council is a political body vested with supreme authority, which seats the NATO ambassadors of the member nations. The council sets and implements basic alliance policies. The NATO Secretariat is directed by the secretary general, who also serves as chairman of the NATO council. Finally there is the integrated military structure, which comprises three strategic area commands; Atlantic Command, European Command, and English Channel Command. Duplication has tried to be avoided within NATO and as a result, integration has been encouraged. America has had the chief responsibility for strategic bombing, and the UK has shared the naval responsibilities on the open seas. Continental countries have carried the primary burden of tactical air warfare and provide the larger share of ground troops.[xxiv]

The alliance was initially characterised by optimism, as there was no assumption of an imminent Soviet invasion of Europe and the defence of Europe did not depend on troop levels. Instead it depended on the atomic protection that the US commitment gave to NATO. US B17’s flying out of Omaha, Nebraska, carrying nuclear weapons, protected the alliance at all times.[xxv] NATO did not remain unchanged for long and the alliance changed drastically between 1950 and 1952, as events conspired to expand its role. In 1949, the Soviet Union acquired the nuclear bomb, and in 1950, war erupted on the Korean peninsula. NSC-68, a report issued by the National Security Council, projected a possible Soviet domination of Europe by 1952 without massive increases in defence spending, from 20% of GDP to over 50% [xxvi]. This led to a dramatic growth in NATO; the unprecedented deployment of US troops in Europe; the creation of an independent Wet German government and the eventual rearmament of West Germany. Plans were made to alter the NATO military structure so as to tie America even more securely to Europe and Dwight D. Eisenhower was selected as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe.

Despite the undoubted need for troops in Europe, influential voices were still heard in favour of disengagement. George Kennan advocated a Soviet withdrawal from Central Europe, and a withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Kennan had never been fully convinced of NATO’s worth, and declared, “We must get over this obsession that the Russians are yearning to attack and occupy Europe.”[xxvii]  On October 4, 1957 however, the Soviets launched Sputnik, raising fears that the Soviets could dominate the world from space. Any advantage America had enjoyed in the nuclear race was broken with the launch, for Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles would make America as vulnerable to a Soviet attack as Europe.

In 1961, the New Frontier promised to transform NATO. Firstly there was recognition of NATO as a genuine partnership in which Europe and America would meet as equals. Secondly, there was an effort to change the military emphasis of the alliance to political and economic purposes. President Kennedy’s plans were based on the concept of a community of interests resting on two pillars standing astride the Atlantic. “The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership- a system of co-operation, interdependence and harmony, whose peoples can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world,” Kennedy said in 1963.[xxviii] President Kennedy however was not prepared to grant a veto to the allies over negotiations and preferred to deal directly with the Soviets. “For Truman and Eisenhower, the Atlantic Alliance served to resist Soviet aggression. JFK wanted an Atlantic Community that would lead the way into what would be called a New World Order.”[xxix] There was another important distinction between Kennedy and the earlier administrations. Kennedy was appalled by the possibilities of Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation. Many questioned America's ability to carry through on such a policy, especially following Secretary of State Christian Herter's statement in 1959 that he could not “conceive of any president engaging in all out war unless we were in danger of all out devastation ourselves.”[xxx]  Flexible response replaced massive retaliation under President Kennedy.

Throughout the 1960's, a number of publications appeared, stating that NATO had become irrelevant. Senator William Fulbright declared, “The myth is that every Communist State is a relentless enemy of the free world; the reality is that some Communist regimes pose a threat to the free world while others pose little or none.”[xxxi] Senator Fulbright felt NATO had become a symbol of America's “arrogance of power” which would destroy America’s own freedom. The price paid for a Pax Americana would be a shrinking of liberty at home as the military industrial elite assumed control of the global economy on behalf of the few against the many.[xxxii] France was the most vocal critic of American leadership in the Alliance.

French concerns were increased following American actions over Indochina, the Suez Canal, and the Algerian crisis. The French withdrawal from the organisation in 1966 caused NATO structures to be altered and the political and military headquarters were moved from France to Belgium. The war in Vietnam diverted American attention away from Europe, a continent united in its lack of support for the American war effort. The Nixon doctrine reflected the limits to American power, but the President held firm against NATO reductions. Nixon’s call for Europeans to do more for themselves stemmed from a desire to minimise American responsibilities abroad, as a way to “Assuage domestic opposition through a limited military retrenchment, yet remain politically engaged throughout he globe.”[xxxiii] In the 1970's, no American president satisfied NATO allies; Gerald Ford was seen as being too weak, and Jimmy Carter was perceived as too volatile. Ronald Reagan, it was felt was too bellicose. By the Mid 1980s the consensus was that the alliance continued to be important to the stability of the west. There was no viable alternative in place or in prospect.

America did not waste time in imposing its political will on the Alliance. NATO was designed to appear as if it gave Britain, France and Germany a strong voice in the defence of Europe. However, it has been and remains to be a predominantly American operation. Notions of equality are presented to placate national egos, but the truth is that “through NATO, America can dictate its will to the British, French, and the Germans.”[xxxiv] NATO therefore is an alliance of un-equals. The inequity between the United States and Europe lies in the fact that American capabilities are the foundation for western security policies.  American military domination of the Organization is almost total. The Supreme Commander of NATO troops is always an American, beginning with Eisenhower, and including Al Haig. Since the 1950s, America has provided the military leadership and stationed thousands of troops in Western Europe to prevent any possible Soviet encroachment. America has provided NATO a heavy lift capability, without which, it would have been unable to deploy its military assets successfully. This co-operation paid off in the Gulf War and in Bosnia, where military operations were largely built upon NATO command and control activities.

In addition to leaders and manpower, America's nuclear arsenal was the bedrock of European security throughout the Cold War. Under Eisenhower's Massive Response, and Kennedy's strategy of Flexible Response, the nuclear umbrella always covered NATO. With the 1967 adoption of Flexible Response, NATO implied that it had the capabilities to respond to an attack at whatever level might be appropriate. These capabilities were of course, predominantly American. NATO even reserved for itself the right of ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons if that proved necessary to repel a Soviet attack. The use of such weaponry however, would be at the discretion of the American Commander In Chief, the President of the United States. Conventional and nuclear weapons were intimately intertwined. “Theatre nuclear forces, directed at regional threats, provided the link between US conventional and strategic nuclear forces, thus tying American nuclear capabilities to the defence of its allies.”[xxxv]

Politically, the United States is also dominant, and is able to prevail on policies that are unpopular both with allied governments and their electorates.  “It wins on such issues because it is a superpower and it is a superpower because it wins.”[xxxvi] America’s success lies in the willingness of other NATO governments to listen more to US opinions than to others. At the heart of this lies a simple strategic fact; European security policy is founded on the continuing US military commitment to NATO. This however, can leave Europe at the whim of the Americans. Following the 1981 clamp down by the military government in Poland, President Reagan wrote in his diary, “We should quarantine the Soviets and Poland with no trade or communications. Also tell our NATO allies to join us in such sanctions or risk an estrangement from us.”[xxxvii]

America does not always get her own way, for whilst membership of NATO involves a compromise in sovereignty for European states, it does not mean total acquiescence. In the 1960s a series of disputes resulted in President de Gaulle withdrawing French forces from NATO and expelling US bases from national territory. In the 1980s, America attempted to stop France, West Germany and Italy from importing natural gas from the USSR. When persuasion failed, economic pressure was applied, and sanctions were imposed on western companies that accepted contracts for constructing the pipeline. The western governments refused to be intimidated and eventually President Reagan had to back down, and the pipeline went ahead.

American domination of NATO is complete. If it were not, it is arguable that NATO would not work.[xxxviii] Were it not for American pressure, few things of importance would be decided at NATO and it is not hard to imagine the alliance grinding to a halt and ceasing to produce anything more than the impression of activity. Yet it is possible for America to go too far. Recently, the former National Security Adviser Zbiginew Brezinski warned of just this; “If we and Europe do not have a genuine reality of partnership, the American public will occasionally veer towards isolationism and unilateralism.  That could adversely affect the very unique relationship that we have with each other.”[xxxix]

The preamble to the NATO Treaty declares member states “are determined to safeguard the freedom of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”[xl] This is similar to the quest for “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” sought by the American Declaration of Independence.  American leadership of the Alliance insured that “the new international order would be justified in moral and occasionally even messianic terms.”[xli] American participation in NATO was in many ways an idealistic decision based on an acceptance of fundamental values and comprehensive solutions instead of realistic calculations of national security.  NATO is an example of why isolationism is no longer an option for the United States. In order to shape the world, America needs to be fully engaged in it. Through NATO, America has been able to fulfil the Wilsonian notion of sharing and imparting her security values on the whole of Western Europe. When one contemplates the manner in which NATO was founded, it is perhaps not surprising that the organisation appears to embody the American values; Dedicated to freedom, a political commitment to common defence and a commitment to the Trans-Atlantic link. As Henry Kissinger points out, “America could not have sustained four decades of gruelling exertion on behalf of a policy that did not reflect its deepest values and ideals.”[xlii]

Despite this, American isolationism still comes to the surface from time to time, and when it does, it is often accompanied by calls for an American withdrawal from NATO. The American long-term commitment to NATO is of concern to most European leaders. For western European members, NATO is the sum total of their strategic concerns. For America however, it is one of a number of regional defence concerns, and her support for NATO has wavered at times. In 1984, Senator Sam Nunn called for greater European contribution to her own defence if American security guarantees were to be maintained.

Whilst support for NATO may have wavered throughout the country and the Congress, it has remained steadfast in the White House. American Presidents have historically been supportive of the Atlantic Alliance, taking an internationalist approach, and placing national and international security ahead of domestic constraints. In 1963, President Kennedy toured Europe to increase support for an Atlantic community based on an equal partnership and to dispel doubts about the willingness of America to fight to defend Europe. On June 26, he spoke from Berlin City Hall, declaring, “All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. Therefore, a free man, I take pride in the words, “Ich bin Ein Berliner.”[xliii]

American leaders face unfamiliar foreign policy challenges in dealing with small states armed with weapons of mass destruction. Allies and enemies can no longer be defined by their status in the Cold War and military planning must move beyond containment and the avoidance of nuclear war. Today's climate of opinion continues to reflect both idealism and internationalism.  Particularly pronounced is the notion of American idealism in enlarging the community of democratic states. This sense of mission was rooted in American history by James Madison who wrote in 1792's “Universal Peace” that he looked forward to a “decline in the role played by war” and in “a revolution in the conduct of diplomacy.”

With the end of the Cold War, NATO has found itself at a difficult juncture. As NATO's collective defence arrangement was based on the concept of an external threat from the USSR, the end of the Cold War has raised questions about its continued viability. NATO has responded to the collapse of its central mission by proposing a major expansion into Central and Eastern Europe. Twice within the Twentieth Century, Central and Eastern Europe produced instability that led to great wars. By expanding to this area, NATO can consolidate the victory of the Cold War and reduce the chances of conflict in the region. NATO would also provide a democratic foundation for the newly independent states. The end of the Cold War has also removed the discernible threat that acted as a central organising principle in American society. Instead of a well-defined threat, America now faces uncertainty in which it must develop foreign policy.

When Bill Clinton became America's first post-Cold War President in 1992, he also became the first President since 1947 who could not merely rely on containment as a comprehensive foreign policy. The regional conflicts that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union and the threat of nuclear proliferation provided a plethora of international problems for a President who had sought office in order to “focus like a laser beam”[xliv] on the domestic economy. As a result, NATO Expansion has been wholeheartedly embraced by the Clinton administration, and is one of the primary foreign policy goals of its second term. “Clinton linked enlargement to the old anticommunist ‘domino theory’ in reverse. It posited that where communist command economics collapsed, free markets would eventually arise and flourish.”[xlv]

American Administrations often adopt a phrase that defines their strategic policies. There has been Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’, Kennedy’s ‘New Frontier’ and Bush’s ‘New World Order’. This is done “to convince Americans and America's allies that the administration has an overall plan and that it is not merely reacting to events as they occur.”[xlvi] At the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, President Clinton put forward his plan for ‘Democratic Enlargement.’ As announced, America's strategic goals would be to consolidate a democratic base, help encourage democracy where possible, contain reactionary regimes that oppose democracy, and pursue select humanitarian goals. “America would remain the world's pre-eminent military power and its chief advocate for liberalizing the global economy.”[xlvii]

NATO enlargement has emerged as the most controversial foreign policy undertaking of Bill Clinton's presidency. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has called NATO “the lynchpin of European security and the principle mechanism for American involvement in Europe.” [xlviii]  The Administration believes that NATO expansion can do for Europe's east what the old NATO did for Europe's west; “vanquish old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter violence in the region where two world wars ands the cold war began.”[xlix] To align themselves with NATO, these states are resolving problems such as border questions, which could have led to future conflict.

President Clinton has based the American decision to invite three new members on the strength of their candidacy. In addition, President Clinton has stated that the new members must confirm their military and political integration into NATO. He has also demanded that they agree to contribute to the financial cost of expansion. Twelve Eastern and Central European nations formally applied for NATO membership. There are five basic criteria for NATO membership: an established democracy, respect for human rights, a market-based economy, armed forces under full civilian control, and good relations with neighbouring states.[l]  Above all, America has four objectives: To keep America engaged in the vital area of European security, enhance the notion of European Collective Defence, stabilise Central and Eastern Europe and to encourage democracy in Russia. American and therefore NATO policy is now based on collective defence and dialogue with Russia.

Whilst the White House announced that Democratic Enlargement was official policy, Secretary of State Warren Christopher disapproved, and “just refused to use the ‘E’ word.”[li] The foreign policy community greeted the Democratic Enlargement policy with derision, viewing it as an uninspired gimmick on the part of National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. Senator John McCain of Arizona dismissed the President as an amateur juggler in the realm of foreign policy.[lii] Opponents of enlargement argued that it would dilute the effectiveness and credibility of NATO. It has been claimed that Clinton's foreign policy decisions appear not to have flowed form a strategic outlook but to have been ad hoc responses to events over which the White House has little control.

It is necessary to dispel the myth that NATO expansion was concocted over night. Many only became aware of the policy following a campaign speech in Detroit during the 1996 presidential elections. Many have concluded incorrectly that this was another example of ad hoc, photo opportunity foreign policy by Bill Clinton, or merely a sop to the Polish community of Michigan. Little could be further from the truth, for expansion was mentioned at the 1994 Brussels Conference. Following the collapse of the USSR, such discussions were inevitable as world bodies shifted to accommodate profound changes in international circumstances. Clinton's speech in Michigan was the sign of a man ahead in the polls, confident of victory and with four years of dealing with NATO behind him.

George Kennan has criticized Clinton's plan for NATO enlargement, calling it  “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”[liii] Kennan believes enlargement will have an adverse effect on Russian democracy and lead to another Cold War due to Russian militarism. Kennan has called NATO expansion; “a badly conceived strategy designed to counter a highly artificial, unforeseeable and improbable military conflict.”[liv] However George Kennan was not an admirer of Truman's Containment Policy. Kennan felt that America must fill the post war vacuum in Europe. The Truman Doctrine was an interpretation of Kennan's advocated policy, but Kennan felt it was too dependent on military strength and too neglectful of moral leadership. Simply, the Truman Doctrine was too crude for Kennan.[lv]

America's policy on NATO expansion has an idealist quality to it. The Administration has helped Russia to privatise more property in less time than any other foreign development in history. By the end of 1995, 117 countries, nearly two of every three independent nations, had their leaders chosen in open elections. Yet there is also a more realist aspect.  The whole strategy of enlargement is a rejection of the idealist notion that America was duty bound to promote constitutional democracy and human rights everywhere. Russia is also an enormous market for American exports, and America is already Russia's largest foreign investor with commercial transactions amounting to more than $4 billion. There are also geopolitical factors involved. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are being selected because of their strategic value. Slovenia is at least as far along the path of democratic reform but it is not on anybody’s list, because Slovenia does not have as much strategic value to NATO. The Administration has put its own spin on enlargement. “The American people want their country's foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik,”[lvi] Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated. Pragmatic realism first, idealism always a close second. Democratic enlargement follows this principle and could be remembered as the Clinton Doctrine.

Two schools of thought regarding NATO expansion have evolved over the last few years.  The first views rapid NATO expansion as the way to preserve democratic and capitalist institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, whilst maintaining peace and stability. Margaret Thatcher, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brezinski and Richard Holbrooke have increasingly come to sight fear of a resurgent Russia as justification to expand the alliance. The second school is in favour of the ‘parallel track’ approach, which “consists of taking gradual steps toward expanding the alliance, while at the same time encouraging Russia to join NATO in co-operative security arrangements.”[lvii]  This approach has the support of the Clinton White House, but its success will depend on factors that arise within the former Soviet Empire.

Encouraged by American support, the heads of the NATO countries agreed to a process of enlargement that “would reach to democratic states in our East as part of an evolutionary process.”[lviii] Not all Western diplomats favoured a rapid expansion of NATO however, and feared, like the Russians, that it would result in a division of Europe into opposing camps. They attempted to remedy this situation by creating the Partnership for Peace in 1994. Building on ideas first advanced during the Bush presidency, the Partnership for Peace called for NATO military cooperation with non-NATO European states. PfP bestows on all former Warsaw Pact nations, including Russia, the status of ‘partner’, rather than member of NATO. It anticipated former Warsaw Pact nations participating in NATO military exercises but specifically did not provide security guarantees to such states, or automatic membership at some future date. The PfP plan put Russia on the same footing as other former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states. Partnership for Peace is not a way to join NATO, as is often misleadingly asserted, but an alternative to it. Neither is neutrality a bar to membership, for Austria, Moldavia and Switzerland are all neutral members of PfP

Partnership for Peace has been President Clinton's primary instrument for building closer relationships between NATO and the new democracies of Eastern Europe. Whilst it is not a defence alliance it is a positive step in the right direction. Tony Lake said, “Partnership will serve one of the most important goals in our enlargement strategy, building a stable environment in which the new democracies and free markets of Eastern and Central Europe and the former USSR can flourish.”[lix] Critics have called it a Policy for Postponement, a flawed European policy on behalf of a flawed President, unable to embrace the east European states without offending Russia.[lx] It has been criticized for creating two boarders in Europe; one that is protected by security guarantees, and another that is not.

NATO expansion however, risks dividing Europe once more. Whilst enlargement may make new members more secure, it will not enhance the security of those not admitted. Ironically, the countries that are not on Nato's short list are the very countries that are most in need of a common defence organisation like NATO. Partnership for Peace however demonstrates Nato's commitment to European security. There are now twenty-seven Partners involved in dialogue and military co-operation with NATO. In Bosnia the co-operation in S-FOR demonstrates what NATO has actually achieved through its co-operation initiatives. The sixteen NATO allies and seventeen Partners, including Russia, are working together under the same rules of engagement and command structures, in the cause of peace. The British Foreign Office has stated that “the expansion of NATO must not mean less security for those nations not admitted, nor should it be seen as an eastward shift of the old Iron Curtain dividing Europe.”[lxi]

Whilst the President is the main source of US foreign policy he is constrained by the Senate. Having pressed the allies into accepting the enlargement of NATO, President Clinton must now gain the support of two-thirds the United States Senate, where the controlling Republican majority will prove a considerable hurdle. President Clinton wishes to be remembered for promoting peace but faces a conservative Republican Senate, which has questioned the motives behind NATO expansion and expressed concern over the recently signed Founding Act. Many in the Senate are concerned at Russia's perceived ability to frustrate NATO operations and her role in any future decision making process. Clinton's problems have been exacerbated by the retirement of bipartisan and experienced internationalists such as Bob Dole, Sam Nunn, William Cohn and Alan Simpson.  Worse still, “is the poor understanding of central European history by most members of Congress.”[lxii] John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institute has gone further, referring to certain Senators as being “clueless on the subject.”[lxiii]

NATO expansion has become a major test not only of Clinton's ability to conduct foreign policy, but also of America's leadership. Enlargement has bipartisan support, and the Republican leadership are clearly in favour of it. Senate Majority leader Trent Lott has declared “Enlarging NATO is in America's moral, strategic and political interests.”[lxiv] Hearings will be held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Republican Senator Jessie Helms, and is expected to hear testimony from Bob Dole, and George Bush on behalf of expansion. Enlargement is no longer a Clinton’s policy however, it is American policy and its defeat in the Senate would not just be a defeat for Clinton, it would be more importantly, a defeat for the United States. Senate ratification is certainly the most probable outcome. Outright rejection would be the worst possible result, for it would convey an impression of appeasement to Russia, and an inability to lead on the part of America.

The expansion of NATO also commits the U.S. treasury and the Senate must vote on the American share of the cost involved, estimated at being between $30 and $150 billion over the next decade. Serious questions will be raised at a time when pressure is mounting to reduce the national defence expenditure. When the Cold War came to an end, many Americans believed they would reap a ‘peace dividend’ to be invested in alleviating its budget crisis. Now, America is planning a massive extension of its global security commitments that will provide fresh obstacles to balancing America's budget deficit. A State Department report of February 1997 calculated the cost at $35 billion over the next decade. The Congressional Budget Office produced a figure of between $61-$125 billion, whilst the RAND Corporation calculated the cost at between $14-$110 billion. The reasons for such differences lie in the different assumptions that have been made about the future threat to NATO. Whilst the Rand Corporation and the State Department assumed capabilities that would include the provision of collective defence, the CBO calculated on the basis of war as a distinct possibility, using a force package that was twice as large. The State Department has calculated new members’ costs at between $13 to $17.5 billion and current members' costs at between $12.5 to 15.5 billion over a ten-year period. The American total would be between $1.5 to $2 billion in total, or  $150 to $200 million each year.[lxv]

All studies are limited to the first round of expansion. Should expansion continue, costs will clearly increase. The estimates also assume that member states will be able to pay their share. America has made no secret of the fact that it expects Europe to assume a greater degree of the financial burden involved.  These European members are already facing budgetary constraints in preparation for European unification, may also be unwilling to take on the additional expenses of NATO expansion. European leaders realise that America has budgetary constraints of its own. However, such domestic political and economic restraints may seriously affect any chance of compromise. As a result, it may be that America will pay a disproportionate portion of the cost of expansion.  If this proves to be the case, then problems lie ahead in Congress, “Many of the new freshmen politicians in America just don’t understand the importance of maintaining the transatlantic alliance.”[lxvi] The fear is that budgetary cuts may seriously weaken American diplomacy. Veteran members of Congress like Henry Hyde have begun to voice their concern;  “The lack of planning, thought, preparation and anticipation and long-range analysis” will only worsen the unpleasant consequences faced in an “increasingly fatal world of modern weaponry.”[lxvii]

European and NATO leaders have attempted to head off such congressional action. Former British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind declared that “for the US, the cost should be no greater than one tenth of one percent of the current defence budget: $200 million a year out of an annual defence budget of $260 billion. These costs are a small price to pay for the security of the continent.”[lxviii]  In a speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in March 1997, the secretary general of NATO, Javier Solana attempted to alleviate concerns over the cost of enlargement. “Some of the figures that have been quoted by private think tanks are grossly exaggerated and are based on unrealistic assumptions. Any assessment of cost depends on the assumptions the analysts wish to make.  Applicants will pay their fair share of common costs, but it will not be an excessive share. Opening NATO to new members is a good bargain, a sound investment.”[lxix]

It has been suggested however, that no matter how much of a bargain it seems, NATO Expansion may well provoke a costly reaction from Russia, by strengthening the hand of anti-Western nationalists. They fear that enlargement thus risks becoming a self-fulfilling action that brings about a hostile Russia that needs countering. Numerous high-ranking Russian officials have made it clear that even moderates in Russia see NATO expansion as a threat. This is hardly unexpected considering that for forty-five years NATO was foremost threat to Russian security. No amount of reassuring can erase this long-standing perception. Proponents of Enlargement offer a different scenario. In July 1990, NATO declared that the USSR was no longer considered an adversary. Therefore, what is there for Russia to fear?  No one is suggesting a pre-emptive invasion of Russia. US forces in Europe have come down from 320,000 to 100,000 men. What evidence is there that NATO expansion risks worsening the US-Russian relationship? “People have said if NATO expands the Russian public will turn toward the Communists, it hasn't; Yeltsin will fall from power, he hasn't; Russia will greatly increase its military spending. It cannot and it is not trying to.”[lxx]

The British Foreign Office has correctly stated that confidence must be built in Russia to deflect fears of enlargement.[lxxi] This observation demonstrates the main concern, that NATO enlargement is as much a psychological blow to Russia as it is a military strike. Russia is an important world power that has suffered psychologically from its decline since the Cold War. The West must allow Russia to be involved in some major decision-making without providing a Russian veto. Many Russians believe that the West’s true agenda is an emphasis on the expansion of NATO rather then on partnership with Russia.

Therefore, the real question should not be whether to enlarge NATO, but how to do so without antagonising Russia or threatening its legitimate interests. By exacerbating Russian feelings of insecurity, economic and political reforms as well as important arms control measures could be sacrificed. The expansion of NATO may endanger attempts to finally rid the world of nuclear weapons - reviving the arms race and creating a new division of Europe. A defence alliance around the perimeter of Russia, from the Balkans to Moldavia and the Ukraine, may have a serious impact in Moscow and could restart a conventional arms race with Russia. Leading Russian politicians have already called for arms modernisation which Russia could ill afford A more likely reaction would include a higher alert status for Russia's nuclear weapons and renewed deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Western portion of Russia. 

Ultimately NATO is a defence alliance. For all the political rhetoric about ‘expanding democracy’, NATO expansion is fundamentally about extending the western defence apparatus ever closer to Russia. As such, the NATO question is about the control of nuclear weapons. Both Russia and America keep its nuclear forces on continuous alert status, prepared to initiate a massive attack on the other within a few minutes. Much has been made of the decline in nuclear arsenals, and the de-targeting of such weapons. Despite those changes, the underlying threat remains relatively unchanged. The target assignments can be easily restored and the firepower still available is capable of devastating both societies.

However Russia has lost segments of the Soviet-era early warning network, so her forces are more vulnerable to the increasingly sophisticated capabilities of U.S. conventional forces. With the Russian government's urgent domestic priorities, there is no prospect that the military establishment could redress this imbalance. The question is the extent to which they compensate by increasing reliance on nuclear weapons deployments. Official Russian military doctrine already has indicated an intention to compensate in this manner. Russia has accepted enlargement but has stated that it will affect arms control agreements such as START and other treaties. Numerous high-ranking Russian officials have stated that expansion may cripple efforts to revise the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, a view reflected in the Duma's resistance to the START II Treaty. Seen in this light, it seems clear that instead of cementing the West’s victory in the Cold War, NATO expansion may revive the arms race, produce a new division of Europe and restore Cold War tensions. 

When expansion was first mentioned at the 1994 Brussels Conference, little thought was given to the effect that this would have on existing arms control agreements. START and the INF treaty could both be jeopardised if Russia begins to fear a threat to the balance of power. The Russian Foreign Minister has threatened to halt treaty obligations, including Missile verification inspection tours by the US Intelligence Agencies. The Russian military perceive themselves to be under threat by expansion, despite Warren Christopher's pledge of no need, no intention and no wish to stage nuclear weapons in the new member states. One possible solution would be to agree to Russian demands for a revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Many Russians feel the CFE Treaty has placed strict limits on their ability to deal with a resurgent China and a revolutionary Muslim minority. NATO has indicated it may wish to revise the treaty in light of the recent crises in the Balkans and its deployment there.

There has been much progress made in nuclear reduction. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear stockpiles, and important steps have been taken to de-target strategic missiles. START I has entered into force, and once START II is ratified; America and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on START III. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are nuclear weapon free and both nations signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996. The CFE Treaty was signed in 1992 setting the limits of conventional weapons in Europe. It has reduced tank levels by 75% and artillery levels by 50% Any enlargement of NATO would alter the balance of military power. Can NATO station troops in Central and Eastern Europe without violating the treaty? This could lead to a withdrawal from CFE by Russia. The response could be a full CIS defence community, as Russia feels betrayed by the west. They saw the end of the cold war as an act of faith, which is now being betrayed. The goal should be to enlarge NATO in a manner that is consistent with maintaining military credibility but without threatening Russia’s legitimate interests. “NATO should adapt its roles and missions, and be used to realise the goals of a truly democratic Europe, which the Marshall Plan set 50 years ago.”[lxxii]

In recent years we have witnessed a transformation in world affairs, from a dangerous, well ordered world, to one that is “more free but less stable.”[lxxiii] With the collapse of the Soviet Empire many believed we were entering a New World Order, following the triumph of Western liberal democracy over communism. Surely this was “The End of History.”[lxxiv] In retrospect however, the Cold War years seem far clearer, for they provided a known and relatively predictable adversary. Today, America faces uncertainty as it tries to anticipate the future international environment without an overarching threat to provide an anchor for her foreign policy. Russian certainties have been replaced by questions concerning the identity of adversaries and the time frame within which challenges may arise.[lxxv] Such uncertainty presents problems for the Atlantic Alliance for the absence of a specific threat has threatened to weaken American resolve. NATO's collective defence policy was always based on there being an external threat.  Senator Sam Nunn of the Senate Armed Services Committee has stated, “The day when NATO takes in Russia as a member will be the day when NATO is no longer needed as a threat based security alliance.”[lxxvi] 

However, due to the importance of the American militarily and politically involvement, only NATO has the potential to transform itself and deal with the problems of the 21st century. Europe lacks the military logistics, resources and the political will to do so alone. There has been speculation surrounding the West European Union that France would like to eventually merge into the European Union as a defence arm. President Jacques Chirac has begun to reintegrate France back into the integrated NATO command structure, whilst declaring that France intends such re-integration should lead to “the emergence of an entity in which it expects to take a leading role.”[lxxvii] Britain and the neutral members of the EU have opposed this, as it would entail collective security among its members. Many states joined the EU for economic reasons and have no interest in entering a military alliance. In addition, Britain fears quite rightly, that such a development could undermine NATO. Lack of true European unity forces America to act as a unifier, offsetting any perceived combination that might arise, such as a Franco-German axis. Militarily, Europe does not posses the necessary command, control, and counter-intelligence that the United States provides in the NATO alliance. Only in small scale operations can the WEU and individual European states operate without the American logistical support needed.

Speculation about the WEU, the future French role, and the continued presence of America in Europe threatens the cohesive collective security principle of Article 5 that has kept the NATO alliance together for 50 years. To dilute the concept of  “an attack against one is an attack against all” would severely weaken the alliance. Currently however, there is no major threat for which the clause was designed. As such it is crucial to adapt the alliance to the conditions of the post-Cold War world, without diluting its effectiveness.  The Alliance must adapt at a time when America wants Europe to carry an equal burden. This may mean Europeans running operations using American logistics, under the command of a European general. Whilst this idea is not popular with Congress, America must realise that if the Europeans are going to carry an equal burden, a European Commander may be required for European-only operations, acting independently of America, while still using NATO assets. This would work only if the NATO assets that were used came from European members and this is unlikely because so much of the critical logistics are American owned. Whilst Americans oppose the use of their resources and forces under foreign control, such a unilateralist attitude may strain the alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has proven to be the most successful peacetime alliance in history. Fifty years after its founding, it remains the cornerstone of American policy in Europe. It has continuously served the vital purpose of keeping America in, Russia out and Germany down. Since the end of the Cold War NATO's agenda has been dominated by five issues: Redefining the Atlantic Alliance; Equality of burden sharing; Crisis management and peacekeeping in out of area contingencies; Developing co-operative relations with former East European nations, and expanding eastward. Just as the end of the Cold War has proven problematic for NATO, so it is now difficult to compartmentalise American foreign policy. The warfare between idealism and realism continues today. Both philosophies continue to be part of policymaking process. They are not mutually exclusive, and both are intrinsic elements of policy making, competing to define the nation's objectives. Thus American foreign policy traditionally encompasses both prudent realism and moral idealism. Idealism is used to sell American policy to Americans and to the world. Pragmatic realism continues to underlie the majority of US policy however, still coated in red, white and blue idealism. Just as the Marshall Plan idealistically rebuilt Europe, whilst realistically doing so as a market for American exports, so the Gulf War was portrayed as a battle for democracy whilst being a struggle for control of the Kuwaiti Oil fields. Now NATO expansion is being promoted as a Marshall Plan for the Twenty-First Century. Realistically however, it is opening up Eastern Europe for American trade. All of the major American armament companies have been plying their wares in Eastern Europe, long before the decision was made to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO. Idealism and realism respond to two indispensable needs; to protect the nation from external threats in a hostile world and to stand for ideals worthy of emulation. This duality accounts for Washington's ability to pursue seemingly contradictory foreign policy goals.

NATO's configuration has been altered before. France pulled out of the integrated military command structure in 1966, prompting the transfer of NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels. Greek military forces withdrew from NATO in August 1974 after Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus but rejoined in 1980. Spain was admitted to the alliance in 1982.  At the 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession negotiations. It began an enhanced Partnership for Peace programme the NATO-Russia Founding Act establishes the basis for a permanent security partnership between the two sides, laying to rest the notion that they were forever destined to be adversaries. Many of the new dangers are regional, so the new NATO will be larger than before, but it will have a new focus. Alliance activities shall be less concentrated on collective defence and more focused on the defence of wider, common interests. Secretary-general Javier Solana has said that NATO's most vital task is to keep the Atlantic Alliance healthy.[lxxviii] Addressing the Madrid Summit, President Clinton said, “We are determined to create a future in which European security is not a zero sum game. That is old thinking; these are new times. Together, we must build a new Europe in which every nation is free and free nation joins in strengthening the peace and stability for all.” [lxxix]

NATO embodies the trust that the US and Western Europe now share.  It is a trust born of over five decades of close co-operation and consultation.  The ultimate aim of NATO expansion must be to make the whole of Europe as peaceful and secure as Western Europe. To do so, it will be necessary to share and extend NATO’s assurances and habits of trust; collective defence commitments; joint operations, with members and non-members; and new partnerships, where consultation is the order of the day. The official rationale for the expansion of NATO is to provide the stability and security required for democratic and free market reforms in Eastern Europe. However the most likely new members - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the Eastern European states in which such reforms require the least encouragement and protection.  The countries where such reforms are needed the most - Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic states and Slovakia - are the countries which have been excluded from the first round of the expansion process. 

The Russians have become increasingly aware that the West’s true agenda is “emphasis on the expansion [of NATO] rather then on partnership with Russia.”[lxxx]  The NATO Russia Founding Act, and their inclusion in the Partnership for Peace programme have addressed Russian fears.  The Partnership for Peace programme however, is likely to be little more than a stepping-stone on the way to a complete reorganization of NATO for the 21st century. That reorganisation may involve the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The OSCE already includes the United States, Canada, the nations of the former Soviet Union, and all the European nations in between on equal footing. It has dealt in a wide variety of security concerns including conflict mediation, refugees and security building measures and political reform. As such, the OSCE could compliment the PfP and could be reformed as the primary European security forum. In the past the Western nations have been powerless to help the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. This is no longer the case. Germany does not want to remain the eastern border of he Western Alliance. Enlargement will also result in American influence spreading over Central and Eastern Europe. “Europe today faces an opportunity that comes around only once in a generation. We can make the next century safer, more stable, more peaceful than this one. We will close the book on Yalta and put the division of Europe permanently behind us.”[lxxxi]

 How successful America will be at herding Europe across Bill Clinton's much vaunted ‘bridge to the twenty first century’ [lxxxii]and beyond will depend greatly on the leadership he displays in the remaining years of the Twentieth Century. NATO is a great western institution. “Men of vision created it, and it has formed the bedrock of our security for five decades.  It is our insurance policy against any threat to peace.  Only NATO has the capacity to mount a challenging military operation. If we can involve all Europe in Europe's security, we can entrench freedom and trust for us all.”[lxxxiii] It needs to be expanded to keep the implied promise to East Europe to join the free world after the Cold War. Freedom, democracy and market economies were the goals of the Cold War, now they can be implemented. Expansion would lead to a stabilizing effect in the East and would anchor the nations into the West. It would give the West and the US a voice in the East.  It would counter threats from German nationalism and expansionism. “America is the only idealistic nation in the world. It is the most idealistic force of history,”[lxxxiv] said Woodrow Wilson in 1919. The west is morally bound. “If we do not enlarge NATO we will be validating the dividing line Stalin imposed in 1945 that two generations of Americans and Europeans fought to overcome”[lxxxv] Secretary Albright told the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 23 1997. There can be no turning back now that Clinton has given full support and after Madrid. Expansion is likened to the Marshall Plan, and this may be a short window of opportunity in which to proceed. In Paris on May 29, the Prime Minister stated, “we live in a world without war. This is a prize without value. NATO has served Europe well, and has been the corner stone of European defence.”[lxxxvi] Long may it so continue, whilst never forgetting the wise words of Reinhold Niebuhr, “Let the righteous nation never forget the depth of evil to which communities may seek when they try to play the role of God in history.”[lxxxvii]