Evolving Intelligence

On September 10, 2001 the events of the following day would have been perceived as unimaginable to most people. Islamic terrorists would seize four passenger planes and deliberately crash two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. A third jet would hit the Pentagon, whilst passengers, struggling to prevent another calamity, would allegedly bring down the fourth plane over Pennsylvania. The twin towers’ descent to what would become Ground Zero became an indelible image for our age, as the 16-acre site that had been a workplace to over 40,000, became a mass grave to the thousands of victims entombed in the doomed towers. However, as the World Trade Centre disintegrated, the fallout, both literally and figuratively, was already beginning.

The smoke was still billowing and the fires would continue to burn for another 100 days, but the political repercussions began in earnest with commentators and members of Congress blaming the attacks on budgetary cuts and codes of conduct imposed on the CIA by former President Bill Clinton. Congressman Rohrabacher of California blamed Clinton for “letting the Taliban go over and over again.”[i] Rush Limbaugh pressed that Clinton “be held culpable for not doing enough when he was Commander in Chief.”[ii] Former Senator Bob Kerrey said that Clinton had erred in his response to previous attacks and “should have treated them as an attack on the United States.”[iii] Former adviser Dick Morris claimed Clinton was too "distracted, disheartened and depressed,”[iv] by scandal to concentrate on international terrorism. When Clinton did launch attacks on Osama bin Laden’s terrorist camps, critics alleged that he was merely ‘wagging the dog,’[v] and his policy of utilising missiles rather than ground troops was called into question; “This low-risk effort helped bin Laden in the Muslim world. He looked strong, and we looked weak.”[vi] Journalist George Will wrote that Clinton’s use of Tomahawks cruise missiles, which former Speaker Newt Gingrich had already referred to as “totally inadequate,”[vii] was in fact “the most feckless use of military power since President Carter invaded Iran with eight helicopters.”[viii]

September 11, 2001 instantly joined December 7, 1941 and November 22, 1963, as a day that would “live in infamy.”[ix] As with Pearl Harbour and Kennedy’s assassination, it would be a date from which time was marked. It would become a watershed date, referred to as the day that “the post Cold War era ended.”[x] It was also a date that would have a deep impact on two administrations. Whilst President George W. Bush would be seen to seize the moment and see his poll numbers jump accordingly, so the events of September 11 would be used to further tarnish the previous Administration of President Bill Clinton. The attacks changed much in American politics, but Bill Clinton’s capacity to draw criticism remained, as some sought to portray the attacks in terms of an opportunity seized by Bush and squandered by Clinton.

In light of these accusations, any assessment of President Clinton’s legacy must examine his relationship with the intelligence community to discern his level of responsibility for the attacks of September 11. What changes did Clinton introduce to the CIA and how did these alterations contribute to the attacks in New York and Washington? It is necessary to delve beyond Clinton’s Presidency however, to address the long-standing issue of the relationship between the presidency and the CIA. What degree of responsibility can be assigned to the bureaucratic and constitutional parameters within which this relationship must operate? The initial claims of culpability were simplistic and politically motivated, but what of the larger question regarding the failure of the CIA to prevent the attacks? Was this a singe, catastrophic blunder, or was it indicative of a long-term failure to diagnose a serious threat to US security? Above all, one must assess whether Clinton should be judged in the context of his own time, as a President focused on domestic issues when few deemed terrorism a top priority, or judged harshly with benefit of hindsight, as a Commander-in-Chief who allowed a deadly enemy to fester?

Clinton’s critics have alleged that as President, Bill Clinton was responsible for negligently downgrading the CIA, and that the attacks of September 11 were a direct result. When one considers who has made such allegations, it appears that political opportunism was involved here, as the President’s opponents sought to manipulate the tragic events to further their own political agenda. Indeed, it can be argued that far from taking bold new decisions with the CIA, it appears that President Clinton moved cautiously to implement initiatives decided by former President George Bush. Furthermore, many of President Clinton’s decisions and actions were dictated or restricted by actions taken by previous administrations. As we view President Clinton’s relations with the CIA, we see a President attempting to utilise a tool of the Cold War to wage a new “twilight struggle,” [xi]in the changing environment he found himself presiding over.

When discussing President Clinton’s dealings with the CIA, one must recall that the Agency’s reputation conceals its standing as only one in a series of intelligence organisations operated by the US Government. Created by the 1947 National Security Act, the CIA constitutes less than a fifth of the intelligence community’s expenditure and a smaller percentage of its employees. Its attention derives less from its size than from its reputa­tion as the covert arm of the United States government during the Cold War. By 1992 however, the Cold War was over and the future international role of the CIA and the United States generally, was under discussion. In this new environment, when even Henry Kissinger noted, “the new President must find a role for an America that can neither dominate nor retreat,”[xii] the world was looking to the newly elected Clinton Administration for leadership. To quell concerns of a potential isolationist stance, the incoming President reassuringly promised “an essential continuity in our foreign policy.”[xiii]

One area that exemplifies this was Clinton’s relationship with the CIA and its place in the bureaucratic structure. In the early 1990s, President George Bush had conducted an examination of the Intelligence Community and instigated a steady series of budgetary cuts from its historic high of $30 billion per annum in 1991, to $28 billion by 1993.[xiv] When Clinton initiated the comprehensive Bottom Up Review of the nation’s defence capabilities, many believed the CIA would be curtailed, as its ability to provide accurate intelligence in the past had raised questions about its future role.  Indeed, by 1992 many in Congress felt the CIA had “lost its traditional enemy without finding a new role.”[xv] Reflecting these concerns, Clinton’s team “discussed plans to cut the Intelligence budget by about a quarter of the total by 1998.”[xvi] Bureaucracies however are resistant to change, and the CIA was no exception, insisting that the world was now more dangerous and that America needed to increase its intelligence capabilities! Despite these claims, CIA recruitment was frozen and staff levels were cut by 24% by 1994, twice the rate recommended by the National Performance Review. “By 1997, 1,000 analysts had retired from the CIA, scaling the agency back to 1977 levels.”[xvii] 

Despite criticism levelled after September 11, the CIA’s decline had begun in 1961, when Bill Clinton was fourteen years old. Interestingly, Bill Clinton’s presidential style and the decline of the CIA can be traced back to the Kennedy Administration, which introduced informality, a large White House staff and began the eclipse of the CIA by the National Security Council. The 1961 landing at the Bay of Pigs tainted the agency and Kennedy’s decision to strip the CIA of its covert military function was indicative of the priority the CIA would now be accorded. The NSC would become the coordinating body of the Executive branch as it sought to influence and manage the balance of power between the Departments of State and Defence. Although President Reagan elevated his Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to the Cabinet, this was due to William Casey’s management of Reagan’s 1980 campaign team. During his administration, Reagan continued to run his foreign policy initiatives through the NSC, as the Iran Contra scandal demonstrated. Even former DCI, George Bush refused to prioritise the CIA during his presidency, with the National Security Agency increasing in stature during his administration.

Whilst President Clinton continued the informal structure at the White House, choosing to debate subjects with interested parties, rather than adhere to formal briefings, he did make structural changes. Clinton was determined to focus on the domestic economy, an area that former President George Bush was believed to have neglected.  Accordingly, the National Security Council was altered to reflect Clinton’s priorities, as the NSC’s formal responsibilities were expanded to include not only foreign, military, and intelligence matters, but also economic concerns. As a result, the Treasury Sec­retary and the White House Chief of Staff were added as new members.[xviii] Clinton also established the National Economic Council as a financial equivalent of the NSC and along with the domestic economy, foreign economic policy became one of the president’s foremost concerns during his administration. All departments of government were tasked to examine ways in which they could contribute to the President’s efforts to forge a domestic revival and it was in this environment that the new role for the CIA would emerge.

The end of the Cold War placed in jeopardy the notion that whilst Presidents came and went, bureaucracies survived and in this new geopolitical era, the CIA was under great pressure to justify its still staggering budget. The CIA would have been forced to change, regardless of who was in the White House, Bill Clinton’s focus on domestic matters only served to exacerbate the situation. It was Clinton’s predecessor however that had initiated many of the changes that Clinton would implement, particularly the policy of moving the CIA towards the area of Economic Intelligence. In 1991, President Bush began the reallo­cation of resources “away from old Cold War concerns toward new economic tar­gets, as the world marketplace became an ever more important battlefield for America.”[xix] During the Cold War, between 50-60% of its resources had been targeted on the Soviet Union. By 1993, that figure had dropped to 13%.[xx] CIA analysts would continue to examine issues such as weapons proliferation, counter terrorism and traditional espionage activities. However, given the economic situation that Clinton inherited, the CIA would now develop a greatly enhanced role in the area of economic espionage.

Economic competitiveness was the centrepiece of Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign and the candidate had vowed to “make the economic security of our nation a primary goal of our foreign Policy.”[xxi] As President, Bill Clinton realised that the CIA could assist his policy of Engagement and Enlargement, by aiding American companies in the global market. During the Cold War, economic intelligence had accounted for 10% of CIA activity, under Clinton that figure would rise to 40%. The intelligence community had always engaged in economic intelligence gathering, but under Clinton, this new role would help justify the CIA budget and assist the President in his efforts to forge domestic renewal. Business intelligence had played a crucial role during the Cold War. Now intelligence would assist business in the post-Cold War era. Seizing the initiative, the CIA introduced the Daily Economic Intelligence Briefing for White House consumption. “With a run of only 100 copies, only the President’s Daily Briefing, with a run of 32 copies, was more restricted.” [xxii] In the first 17 months of the Clinton Administration, the CIA identified 72 cases of unfair competition. It was then discovered that between 1986 and 1992 the CIA “had identified 250 cases of aggressive lobbying by foreign governments on behalf of their domestic industries that were competing against U.S. firms for business overseas.”[xxiii] This finding convinced officials that the CIA should be tasked with commercial espionage, and reveals the extent of economic espionage before Clinton’s election. 

With an emphasis on a general downsizing of the Agency and a move towards industrial espionage, it emerges that Clinton was building upon policies initiated by his Republican predecessor. What Clinton did was to make past practices official, if sometimes undeclared, policy. This was done in part through a 1995 National Security Strategy statement that noted “collection and analysis can help level the economic playing field by identifying threats to U.S. companies from foreign intelligence services.”[xxiv] The CIA also acquired economic data that affected the broader economic interests of the United States. In 1993, the Agency was believed to have stolen the French delegation’s position papers near the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations, helping U.S. diplomats in their bargaining positions.[xxv] The CIA claims to have uncovered bribes affecting $30 billion in foreign contracts from 1992 to 1995.[xxvi] These findings gave credence to Secretary of State Christopher’s declaration that “Our national security is inseparable from our economic security.”[xxvii] The weight of America’s national security apparatus was brought to bear in maintaining economic security, as under Clinton, economic intelligence gathering became policy. Economic intelligence became one of the few growth areas at the CIA in the 1990s, proving the Agency could adapt to ever changing circumstances.

Electronic eavesdropping on foreign governments and corporations contributed to the President’s policy of domestic renewal and therefore the CIA was able to have a positive impact on the U.S. economy in ways that its founders could not have imagined. This policy soon began to show results as in 1993 alone, the CIA “alerted policymakers to 51 cases involving some $28 billion in sales where these tactics were being used to disadvantage U.S. firms. Where policymakers were able to take action, U.S. firms obtained contracts worth some $6.5 billion.”[xxviii] As with all CIA missions, secrecy was paramount and official CIA denials of economic espionage come as no surprise. Plausible deniability was compromised however when CIA assets were expelled from the Paris embassy in 1995, accused of industrial espionage,[xxix] leading to the realisation that the downside to this new role was the risk of being found spying on allies, and the potential repercussions involved in such a discovery. Yet the use of CIA in economic espionage is a mute one to former DCI Stansfield Turner. “If economic strength is now be recognized as a vital component of national security, why should America be concerned about stealing economic secrets?”[xxx]

Spy satellites and remote eavesdropping stations were re-tasked toward gathering economic intelligence, allowing American companies to benefit from the top secret Echelon system.  Established during the Cold War, Echelon is reportedly capable of intercepting millions of telephone, fax and email messages. The United States, while neither confirming nor denying the existence of Echelon, has already admitted that the US secretly collects information on European firms.[xxxi] Whilst the Washington bureaucracy may feel a degree of embarrassment following such revelations, the CIA has no such qualms, for Echelon has become a key component in its arsenal of intelligence gathering devises and will remain, regardless of international opinion. If “It’s the economy, stu­pid!” was the mantra of Clinton’s campaign in 1992; in office, “within the government’s community of national security planners, the slogan seemed to be, “It’s economic security, stupid!””[xxxii]

The 1994 discovery that CIA insider Aldrich Ames had been a Soviet mole again focused attention on the CIA, as both the White House and Congress “sought explanations for this incredible failure of Agency security.”[xxxiii] As the Doolittle Report of 1954 had done previously, so the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community recommended changes that affected both the White House and the CIA. In particular, it recommended changes to the role of DCI, which by 1996, had been filled by five men in the past six years, taking a toll on the CIA.[xxxiv] “Employees have been left to wonder which policies remain, important initiatives have been put on hold, and there has been enormous uncertainty about the direction of the Agency.”[xxxv] Suggestions that the DCI serve a fixed term were rejected on the basis that the President needed to have full confidence in his DCI, necessitating a political appointment. However, Clinton’s closest foreign policy adviser was not his DCI but his National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, who had been Clinton’s foreign policy adviser during the 1992 campaign. President Bush had appointed Clinton’s first DCI, James Woolsey and the new Democrat President failed to develop a rapport with the Republican appointed DCI. This impacted national security as both Clinton and Lake began skipping Agency briefings. This flawed approach would exacerbate problems in Somalia and Haiti that blighted Clinton’s first year in office.

When U.S. Rangers were ambushed in Somalia during October 1993, the failure to identify the intentions of tribal leader Mohamed Aidid raised doubts about the competence of the CIA. However, it emerged that six days before the ambush, the CIA had sent the White House a top-secret memo titled Looming Disaster, which predicted that such an incident would occur. The warning had gone unread and unheeded.[xxxvi] During the same period, Clinton believed the CIA was engaged in systematic bureaucratic sabotage of his policy of returning Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti. Whilst the President was attempting to shore up support, the CIA briefed Congress that the Haitian leader was unfit to rule. Such actions forced Clinton to reject covert options in Haiti “as the White House did not trust the CIA to carry out its mission.” [xxxvii] This stand off between the White House and the CIA was particularly embarrass­ing to Clinton, as his Haitian policy was already under attack from various quarters. “It was a classic illustration of the different purposes and per­spectives policymakers and intelligence analysts bring to policy problems.” [xxxviii]

When Woolsey departed office in December 1994, he cited family considerations,[xxxix] however, when a small plane crashed onto the White House lawn earlier that summer, “people joked that it was Woolsey trying to get an appointment with Clinton.”[xl] The DCI role proved to be as problematic to fill as any within the Clinton Administration. Initially Clinton nominated former Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Retired General Michael Carns, stating, “You couldn't find someone with a more exemplary career.”[xli] However the FBI discovered the nominee had violated immigration laws and he withdrew once Tony Lake warned him the confirmation hearings "would be a tawdry and nasty process.”[xlii] Desperate to avoid a repeat of the Attorney General debacle,[xliii] the White House quickly nominated Deputy Defence Secretary John Deutch, a man who had previously turned down the DCI position. As an inducement to Deutch, Clinton elevated his role as DCI to a Cabinet-level position for the first time since William Casey held the position from 1980 until his death in 1987.

As in 1980, the decision to elevate the role of DCI was not made out of consideration for the CIA’s position in the bureaucratic structure, but out of naked political posturing. Just as Reagan needed to repay Casey for managing his successful 1980 campaign, so Clinton desperately needed a smooth confirmation and a DCI he could work with. However, whilst an elevated status for the DCI was a prize both Reagan and Clinton were willing to concede, an elevated role for the CIA was not. The Cabinet level role placed Deutch in the position of advocating policy whilst also providing assessments on which to base it. Many at the Agency questioned whether Deutch would be prepared to present the President with intelligence analysis that contradicted official policy. Such concerns proved unfounded, as Deutch refrained from advocating policy with the President, only offering information. “Well, John, I know that you can't have an opinion or any advice on this,” Clinton joked at meetings. “But what do you think?”[xliv] Deutch proved to be “a one-man revolution, attempting to boost the morale of the lower ranks”[xlv] and was considered for Secretary of Defence in Clinton’s second term, although this ultimately did not occur.

For his second term, President Clinton nominated Anthony Lake to serve as DCI, with continuing membership of the Cabinet.[xlvi] This was perhaps a signal that the CIA would receive closer attention and would, for the first time in many years, be led by a DCI who had an excellent working relationship with the President. This would not be like 19980 or the 1994 nomination of Deutch, but appeared to have been a calculated decision by Clinton to elevate the role of DCI to Cabinet rank due to the pre-existing working relationship he enjoyed with Lake. It would also have been difficult for him to downgrade the role in his second term whilst filling the position with a senior member of his first administration. However, the doubts of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman, Senator Richard Shelby proved too much for Lake, who withdrew his nomination in disgust, after his confirmation hearings became bogged down in the partisan fighting that characterised Washington in the mid 1990s. In blocking the appointment of Clinton’s most trusted foreign policy adviser, the Republican controlled Congress altered the intended relationship between the CIA and the White House in Clinton’s second term. Rather than have his designated DCI, Clinton again had to settle for an alternate, in this case, former deputy DCI George Tenet, who was retained by President George W. Bush and who continues to serve as DCI, despite accusations levelled at the CIA following the attacks of September 11. 

Whilst economic security was the priority of the Clinton White House, the Administration was not immune to the horrors associated with National Security. Clinton had been in office just 38 days when the World Trade Centre in New York was bombed, killing six people and injuring more than 1,000. Three years later, the US barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia were destroyed, killing 19 American soldiers. Warren Christopher’s memoirs reveal the state of thinking on the subject in the mid 1990s.“We had no knowledge of what they stood for or where they made their home. While we surmised that their motive derived from some extreme form of Islamic ideology, that suspicion led to no obvious conclusion as to how to anticipate or prevent such attacks in the future.”[xlvii]Other terror attacks would claim the lives of over 200 people, including 29 Americans following explosions at U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, Tanzania, and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. Warren Christopher would summarise the situation perfectly; “Fanatics would plan attacks in one country, execute them in another and flee to a third when the deed was done.”[xlviii] This statement read like a prophecy on the afternoon of September 11, 2001.

It is important to note however, that whilst such attacks occurred, grand scale terrorism remained a hypothetical danger throughout Clinton’s time in office. Despite this, Clinton left office having given greater priority to terrorism than any previous President. Clinton doubled counter terrorist spending across 40 departments and agencies[xlix] and devoted some of his highest-profile foreign policy speeches on the subject, including an addresses to mark the United Nations’ 50th anniversary, when he spoke of the terrorists who had “plotted to destroy the very hall we gather in today.”[l] It is clear that Clinton identified terrorism as a threat, but neither the President nor his Administration felt it was their main concern, because it was not. In the 1980s and 1990s, 871 Americans died in terrorist attacks at home and overseas, an average of less than 44 a year. Paul R. Pillar of the CIA’s counter terrorism centre, observed, “fewer Americans die from it than drown in bathtubs.”[li] That is not to say that the Administration did not consider the threat from terrorism, merely that it was one of a series of threats that had to be considered. Presidential Decision Directive 35 set out the Clinton Administration’s intelligence collection priorities on March 2, 1995. Terrorism was placed in the third tier, after support for ongoing military operations and analysis of potential enemies in Russia, China, Iraq and Iran. Despite accusations made in the autumn of 2001 that Clinton was ambivalent about terrorism, this represented an elevation in status for a danger that had previously received little attention. This marked the Clinton Administration as “the first to undertake a systematic anti-terrorist effort, in terms of resources and anti-terrorist activity.”[lii]

Despite the elevated status afforded to terrorism, a common sentiment following September 11 was that under Clinton, the CIA had failed to do enough to prevent the atrocities. Clearly, the terrorists achieved their mission despite the best efforts of the US Intelligence services. This success meant, “Those measures, which were hardly insignificant, were by definition not enough.”[liii] However, Clinton’s second term National Security Adviser, Samuel Berger rejects the notion that Clinton paid scant attention to terrorism. “This was an urgent priority for the Clinton Administration and the intelligence community specifically engaged in an intensive effort directed at bin Laden across a range of fronts.” [liv] The fronts that Berger mentions covered a wide range of options, including the 1998 authorisation for the CIA to use lethal force in covert operations to pre-empt terrorist attacks on America planned by bin Laden. News reports at the time made much of the decision not to revoke the Executive Order outlawing the murder of foreign leaders. It should be noted however, that such a directive was not required however, as bin Laden was not a Head of State, merely the leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist group.

Following September 11 CIA successes in thwarting terrorist attacks have been forgotten.[lv] In December 2001, Clinton said, “we worked hard to prevent a day like September 11th ever happening. Far more terrorist attacks were thwarted at home and around the world than succeeded.”[lvi] However, Clinton’s critics denounced him for budget cuts and a controversial 1995-recruitment directive.[lvii] The directive compelled CIA case officers to notify headquarters of violent recruits and that such recruitment be assessed at a senior level. However, the directive did not prohibit the CIA from working with terrorists to uncover data, CIA case officers merely had to receive official clearance. Critics however stated that Clinton “gutted our intelligence agencies because he didn’t much like them, and now we can bury thousands of American citizens as an indirect result.”[lviii] Ambassador Paul Bremer, who chaired a national commission on terrorism, declared that the Clinton administration “put into effect guidelines which restricted the ability of CIA agents to go after terrorist spies.”[lix] However, long before September 11, CIA spokesman Bill Harlow denied that the guidelines unduly restricted the agency. “The notion that human rights guidelines are an impediment to fighting terrorism is wrong. The CIA has never turned down a request to use someone with a record of human rights abuses, if we thought that person could be valuable in our overall counter terrorism program.” [lx] It is possible however, that case officers, made cautious by scandal, “no longer dare to launch operations that could get them hauled before a congressional inquisition.”[lxi]

Perhaps the most serious charge levelled at the Administration was its rejection of a Sudanese offer to hand over bin Laden. Former Clinton officials have argued that as there was no solid legal proof to indict bin Laden in America, the Administration asked Saudi Arabia to seize bin Laden, but they refused. Critics have construed this incident as evidence that Clinton was ambivalent to terrorism. The Administration however, had few legitimate options. If bin Laden had been extradited to America, it is unclear what charges he would have faced, as there was little at the time to tie him to specific acts on American soil. Despite the lack of legitimate options, it is vital to realise that there was a secret ongoing operation to expel terrorists to nations that had less stringent human rights policies than America, where local laws would deal with them. Beginning in 1996, the Clinton Administration persuaded allies to arrest members of Al Qaeda and ship them to a third country, without legal process, in a move called ‘rendition.’ In Albania, American intelligence officers guided authorities to five members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who were then flown to Egypt and executed after a military trial. More than 50 Al Qaeda terrorists were forcibly removed in this fashion with a view to “breaking the organization brick by brick.”[lxii]

September 11, 2001 did not mark the first assault on Clinton’s foreign policy and many felt American foreign policy to be “at prey to the whims of the latest balance of forces.” [lxiii] In his first two years, Clinton certainly paid too little attention to foreign policy, as he moved to ensure the domestic economy recovered, and “domestic affairs consumed 75% of his time, foreign affairs less than a quarter.”[lxiv] However, those who blame President Clinton for the attacks on the World Trade Centre are choosing to forget that terrorists had targeted America for decades. Clinton has personally admitted that a higher priority could have been placed on defeating the terrorist during his administration, but his predecessors were also remiss in their attention to the threat posed by terrorism. During the Reagan years, Muslim radicals killed 49 people at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, 241 people in the 1983 destruction of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, several soldiers in a 1986 Berlin disco bombing and 270 people perished when Pan Am flight 103 was brought down in 1988.

It should be recalled that Al Qaeda was not a constant threat throughout Clinton’s term in office and became a major threat only in later years, ironically, when Clinton was in a weakened position. Internationally, his pleas for Saudi Arabia to deal with bin Laden had been rejected and at home, a Republican dominated Congress was moving to impeach him. As Tom Daschle has stated, many who lamented Clinton’s inability to eliminate bin Laden, lambasted Clinton efforts to strike at the Al Qaeda leadership, as attempts to divert attention from his own domestic political concerns. “He was criticized for those cruise missile attacks,” the Senate Majority Leader stated. “He was accused of doing things that had nothing to do with foreign policy as he was trying to respond.”[lxv] Also, many who now champion President George W. Bush’s attacks on bin Laden as “the evil one,”[lxvi] previously attacked Clinton for concentrating to heavily on bin Laden in the fight against terrorism. Those who assert that Clinton should or could have been more assertive in office are guilty of forgetting or conveniently ignoring their response at the time.

During the 1990s, the events of September 11 were perceived as unthinkable, abstract possibilities devised by players of war games at the Pentagon. As such, it would have required incredible political leadership to muster government agencies and political enmities to fight terrorism and harder still to persuade the American people and civil liberties groups that new powers were necessary to prevent catastrophe. Clinton could have done more, and has admitted as much. However, “it is difficult to locate another American President who was able to rouse a happy, populace to sacrifice their lives in the service of an abstraction.”[lxvii] In striking at Al Qaeda, Clinton risked straining relations with the Taliban, who were openly supported by Pakistan, a nuclear power, which in 1998, experienced a coup, led by a military with a high percentage of Taliban sympathisers. Despite these risks, Clinton did attempt to discuss terrorism with the Pakistani leadership, visiting Islamabad on March 25, 2000, over the protests of the Secret Service who feared Al Qaeda could target Air Force One with US provided Stinger missiles. However, with Pakistan and the Taliban both subject to international sanctions and trade embargoes, Clinton had little to offer. Before September 11 there was no public support for losing American lives to suppress terrorism, or for the federalizing of airport security. The Administration also faced pressure from the oil industry not to provoke Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan. Bill Clinton could not change these elements and neither could George W Bush. It took a disaster of epic proportions to shock America into the reality of the 21^st Century.

Many theories have been debated as to the cause of the attacks of September 11, 2001, including Fukuyama’s End of History and the Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Whilst these texts offer conceptual theories, the notion of Blowback best illustrates the physical impact that American foreign policy can have. The term blowback refers to the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people. September 11 can be seen as a classic example of U.S. policies producing unintended, catastrophic consequences. In the 1980s, the CIA secretly backed the Mujahedin,[lxviii] fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Whilst this was one of the most successful covert actions the CIA ever mounted, elements of the Mujahedin would later develop into the Al Qaeda terror network. As such, the events of September 11 demonstrated a textbook example of blowback since the radical Islamic forces associated with the Al Qaeda network were initially supported, funded, trained and armed by the CIA under several administrations. The CIA’s failure was not only to fail to prevent the attacks, but to have actively contributed to producing the groups implicated in the attacks.

In 1862, Abraham Lincoln told America, “We cannot escape history.”[lxix] One hundred and thirty years later, President Clinton came to office with hopes of re-defining America for the 21^st century. Increasingly however, he found himself the prisoner of decisions made years beforehand, as he discovered the long-term costs of fighting the Cold War. Clinton proved unable to escape the legacy of US foreign policy and its Faustian pacts made around the globe. While there were no doubt a multiplicity of contributing factors, the events of September 11 can be read as a blowback of policies of successive U.S. administrations and the CIA who trained, funded, supported, and armed the groups alleged to have carried out the terrorist attacks on the United States. “The lesson should be that it is dangerous and potentially costly to align oneself with terrorist groups and that pacts with obviously brutal and treacherous groups and individuals in violent parts of the world are likely to come back to haunt you.”[lxx]

President Clinton’s relationship with the CIA was indicative of the times in which he served, of the manner of presidency he aspired to and of the place that the CIA now occupies in American political life. With the end of the Cold War, the CIA was forced to change in order to remain credible. However, other elements such as the Ames spy scandal, domestic recession, the personalities of Presidents, Senators and DCIs, and the bureaucratic structure within which the CIA must operate, all contributed to the status of the CIA under President Clinton. Despite criticism that Clinton failed to adopt an intelligence agenda for the 21^st century, it should be noted that few presidents could lay claim to a true intelligence agenda for their time in office. Christopher Andrew has suggested that “over the past two centuries, only four presidents; Washington, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Bush, have shown a real flair for intelligence.”[lxxi] If the figure really is this low, then how different was Bill Clinton from his predecessors? The more one examines much of President Clinton’s program and his relationship to the CIA, the more one sees a policy of continuation rather than change. The position of the CIA in the National Security structure had been in question since 1961 and whilst Clinton’s campaign rhetoric may have been of revolution, the changes he initiated were far more evolutionary, as he built upon decisions and directives inherited from his predecessor, former DCI, George Bush. Increases in the use of CIA for economic surveillance began under President Bush, as did the cutbacks in the CIA budget. Indeed, in May 1989, Bush made a statement that Clinton would echo many times in his presidency. Referring to the findings of National Security Directive NSD-23, Bush declared, “we hope to move beyond containment, we are only at the beginning of our new path.”[lxxii]

During the early 1990s, the question of where that new path would lead, and what comprised the national interest remained ambiguous. President Clinton came to office with the three main pillars of his foreign policy in mind; “security, domestic economic renewal and enlarging the community of democracies.”[lxxiii] Building upon Bush’s calls to progress beyond Containment, Clinton espoused a policy of Engagement and Enlargement with which to address the new geopolitical landscape. Rejecting calls to eliminate the CIA as “profoundly wrong,”[lxxiv] Clinton realised that to endure, the CIA would have to change. The new environment called for new security priorities and whilst Clinton was not elected to dwell on foreign issues, the CIA was utilised to advance the cause of the Clinton Presidency; domestic renewal. “Clinton rearranged the traditional priorities, raising economic issues to the same level of importance as strategic affairs.”[lxxv] However, the end of the Cold War removed any unifying thoughts from the minds of policy makers in Washington. Lacking con­sensus at home over the challenges of the post-Cold War world, the clarity of vision and consistency of purpose so crucial to a successful foreign policy failed to crystallize. That changed on September 11, 2001. In light of the attacks, Clinton’s critics have suggested that as President, he could have mustered a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan to capture the Al Qaeda leadership. This however, is to forget that at the time, the Congressional majority was seeking to impeach him. “People talk about Bill Clinton's unwillingness to engage. But low-risk, long-distance assaults were all that the public, and the military, and many of our allies would tolerate—and I didn't hear very many Republicans screaming about the need for close-work then, either.”[lxxvi]It is also important to remember that it was the Republican controlled Congress that blocked the confirmation of Clinton’s choice to head up the CIA in 1996 and also had complete oversight capability for the CIA during Clinton’s time in office. 

Despite suggestions that al Qaeda was a constant threat throughout Clinton’s term in office, the group only became a major threat in Clinton’s latter years. Once that threat became clear, the Clinton administration attempted to strike lethally at bin Laden. Clinton took terrorism seriously and approved enormous increases in counter terrorism spending by the F.B.I. and other federal agencies. “I always thought this guy was a big problem,” he said. “I do not believe based on what options were available to me I could have done much more than I did.”[lxxvii] Of course, counter terrorism is a competitive game. “The terrorists are not inert objects; they are living, conniving strategists. They, too, fail frequently and are sometimes caught before they can strike. But once in a while they will inevitably get through.”[lxxviii] Both in office and since his time in the White House, Clinton has had a practical and pragmatic approach to terrorism. “Terror has never succeeded and it won't this time. I can't say there won't be more terrorist attacks, there probably will be, but I can say for sure it won't prevail unless we decide to give it permission and I do not believe we are about to make that decision.” [lxxix]

The causes of the September 11 attacks are highly complex and despite attempts by individuals on the right of American politics to further tarnish the Clinton Presidency, the idea that one individual is to blame is simplistic in the extreme. There was much more involved and one must look at the event not in terms of days or weeks, but at its place in history and the history of American foreign policy. If the dangerous tool of hindsight is to be applied to the events of September 11, then it must be applied totally, and not limited to the Clinton Administration. The events of September 11 must be seen in the context of several US administrations and CIA action from the late 1970s, to the present, to see why sectors of the Arab and Islamic world are pitched against the U.S. Elements of U.S. foreign policy over the past decades have helped generate enemies of the United States in the Middle East and elsewhere, such as support for Israel and inadequate support for the Palestinians.

The National Archive in Washington contains not only the history of a nation, but also a warning, appropriate to remember; what is past is prologue. Despite efforts to forge a new American policy for the 21^st century, President Clinton remained a prisoner of the American policies that dominated the Cold War era, and nowhere was this more apparent than in Afghanistan, where Cold War ambition sowed such deadly seeds of destruction. Despite the vigorous efforts of some to manipulate the events of September 11 for their own political means, it is clear that in his relations with the CIA, President Clinton successfully utilised a Cold War agency to assist him in facing the challenges of the ever-changing world he found himself presiding over.