Foreign Policy Concepts: Isolationism and Idealism

For over 200 years, American foreign policy has been influenced by numerous theories and concerns. Each has dominated for a time and been replaced in what Arthur Schlesinger has called “The Cycles of American History.” Idealism and isolationism are two such elements of foreign policy. Throughout its history, America has exhibited periods of both internationalism and isolationism, as well as periods of Idealism and Realism. Why is this? In answering a question about these positions in American foreign policy it is important to outline the circumstances where both have been used this century.

It is generally accepted that before America took her place as a great power, the US engaged in a fairly uniform policy of non-engagement, or isolationism. Isolationism can be seen as a national policy of holding aloof from other countries or groups. Notions of American isolationism are not new; in fact they pre-date the republic with the earliest seeds of isolationism having been sown by Thomas Paine in Common Sense. “It is in the interest of America to steer clear of Europe,” he wrote. John Adams later declared that America “must separate ourselves from all European politics.” Finally, George Washington’s Farewell Address enshrined the policy for all time. From Washington, through Jefferson, to the Monroe Doctrine, there has been the underlying notion of isolationism in American political life. There were interactions and relations, but the US mainly remained removed from the internal affairs of Europe, a situation highlighted by the British-French War of the 1790’s. Too busy dealing with the domestic growth of the US and rebuilding the nation after the Civil War, 19th century American leaders chose to stay out of the European arena of power politics and the balance of power system.

In 1916 Isolationist sentiment was so strong that President Wilson had to tour the nation to defeat the non-interventionist in Congress, intent on stalling The National Defence Act. Following the War Americans remained isolationist: the horror of battle had not been intended as a prelude to permanent European involvement and the fighting had changed few minds. Indeed the movement gained more than a number of recruits following the carnage and isolationists were able to block American entry to the League of Nations. America moved to a period of political isolationism, but could not prevent the rest of the world carrying on without it. American investment in the outside world meant that America would be an international power regardless of individual political preferences. Even though America had rejected the League of Nations, by 1922 she had unofficial observers there. Despite the presence of American judges, the nation remained absent from the World Court, seen as too much of an extra-national authority by isolationists. Many pacts and treaties of neutrality were signed at this time, notably the Kellogg Briand Pact of 1928 that renounced the use of war as a means of effecting policy.

By 1932, the mood of the nation was such that Franklin D. Roosevelt had to publicly reject his Wilsonian attitudes towards internationalism to be elected President of the United States. By 1940, even with war raging in Europe, leading Americans remained isolationist. Most notable were Charles Lindbergh and Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy. Non-interventionist in the Congress forced the Neutrality Act of 1935 on President Roosevelt to prevent him from selling arms to Britain. They also supported a Constitutional amendment proposing a public referendum before any declaration of war. Such non-interventionist sentiment met with popular approval among the people of the United States. Since World War Two, America has embarked on a global foreign policy that committed it to involvement in every corner of the world. Isolationists however, were vocal critics of the Truman Doctrine of containment.  The era of activism reached its peak in Vietnam, where defeat led to a resurgence of isolationism. Overall however, global activism has dominated American foreign policy since 1945.

Whilst isolationism has always played apart in American foreign policy, a penchant for internationalism has always been evident in American intervention in the political affairs of other nations. It is also evident in efforts to transplant American values around the globe. America has long seen herself as having a special mission in the world, viewing herself as innocent and virtuous in the midst of a tainted world. “The function of American policy is to mark other states up or down according to their obedience to our rules” wrote Professor Arthur Schlesinger. Indeed, according to Schlesinger, American isolationism does not involve American secession from the rest of the world. Its essence was the rejection of commitments to other states, to avoid ‘entangling alliances’ as Jefferson put it.

This dilemma has much to do with policy makers being unable to reconcile the benefits of withdrawing from the world with advantages of reforming it. Louis Hartz has written that America feels the need to “either withdraw from ‘alien’ things, or transform them; It cannot live in comfort by their side.” Whilst the debate between interventionists and isolationists has never been fully resolved, a cycle of behaviour appears to have emerged, with each policy taking a political generation to run its course. This is a prime example of what Arthur Schlesinger refers to as 'the cycles of American history."  The first isolationist phase ended with Washington’s Farewell Address, leading to the early expansionist era that ended with the Monroe Doctrine. The next interventionist era occurred from the time of the Mexican War until the acquisition of Alaska in 1867. The First Word War dominated the next internationalist era, during which America became a world power. The inter- war period was a time of great isolationist sentiment, shaken off by the attack at Pearl Harbour.

As a political philosophy, Isolationism dictates that America serves its interests best by perfecting democracy at home, acting as a beacon for mankind. It also indicates that America’s values impose an obligation to crusade for them around the world, in search of a perfect future. Clearly these can be seen as particularly conservative traits. It is a pessimistic view of human nature and sees inequity between nations as an inevitable feature of international affairs. Foreigners are seen as threatening outsiders. The best way to deal with other nations is to avoid them. Both conservatives and isolationists are reluctant to become involved with others or to assume responsibility for them. They resist legislation that may interfere with a nation’s autonomy and are for the most part inhospitable to social change. The public embraces isolationist policies more enthusiastically than American leaders, and reports indicate that isolationist attitudes are most prevalent among the less educated segments of society.

With the end of the Cold War, the debate over isolationism and internationalism has resurfaced. In 1991, President George Bush used Wilsonian sounding principle to describe his vision of a new world order, dedicated to peace and security, freedom and the rule of law. Bush was such an internationalist that he has been accused of wanting to lead the world rather than just America. The end of the Cold War has resulted in the absence of a discernible threat as a central organising principle. Instead of a well-defined threat, America now faces uncertainty in which it must develop foreign policy. American leaders face unfamiliar foreign policy challenges in dealing with small states armed with weapons of mass destruction. There are also questions over future alliances. Allies and enemies can no longer be defined by their status in the Cold War and military planning must move beyond containment and the avoidance of nuclear war.

President Clinton has remained committed to American activism, claiming that America must "fulfil our responsibility as the world’s sole super-power." This however is not always the view of many in Congress. The view of many of the Republican majority is that there should be major cuts in foreign aid, restricted participation in UN operations, and the end of the Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the US Information Agency. This view has been referred to as 'minimalist' by Haass, and favoured only by those who 'take a narrow view of US responsibility and obligations to meet challenges.' Clearly however, such calls do reflect the thoughts and opinions of some Americans, as personified by Pat Buchanan’s ‘America First’ movement and Ross Perot’s Fortress America references in 1992.

The Clinton Administration caused international concern in 1992 when it stated that the nation's domestic problems would require priority not only at home but also abroad. A series of speeches by top administration officials followed in September 1993 to alleviate fears that Clinton would be an isolationist Democrat, intent only on fixing the economy by protectionist methods. Rather, Clinton has proved to be an Internationalist like his predecessor, President Bush. Thus the Administration has emphasized free trade, open markets and the need to promote American 'competitiveness' in overseas markets. Whilst many of these objectives are consistent with an internationalist approach, the main aim of the Administration has been a return to growth and fuller employment in America. Whereas President Bush used foreign policy for its own end, Clinton has employed foreign policy to assist the domestic economy. The current Administration could not accept an isolationist agenda for it has used International policies to fuel the domestic agenda that was the bedrock of Clinton’s 1992 victory. As such Clinton’s foreign policy is closely linked to domestic economic principles. The GATT and NAFTA successes reveal a worldview that domestic growth depends on foreign economic policy that promotes US exports and world trade. The goal clearly is to avoid the isolationist trade policies of the 1930s. When Britain’s inability to exercise leadership and America’s unwillingness to do so were primary causes of the Great Depression.

America is too entwined internationally with too many obligations and responsibilities to ever to be able to realise such a goal as isolationism, however the sentiment and the fear of involvement remain. The American actions in Bosnia are exemplary of this. Americans have been reluctant to send troops to help end the conflict and as a result the war has lasted for years. Only with the insurance’s of a definite pull out date have the troops actually gone over. One could put this down to the “Vietnam Syndrome” the US reluctance to involve itself in n unpopular war with the risk of high casualties with no definitive national interest. This can be seen as a form of isolationism.

America is now truly internationalist. The GATT deal has been ratified, the NAFTA deal pushed through. American envoys have brokered deals in Haiti, and Bosnia. Operation Vigilant Warrior has kept Kuwait free. Thus as America approaches the 21-century the issue remains the same; Should America be a global power or should it assume a less ambitious posture? Controversy over the answer is unlikely to end as reasonable people will asses the benefits and costs of intrusive Globalism. Current American duality is expressed by the President himself, declaring that “America cannot turn her back on the world” and yet at the same time stating that “America cannot be the world’s policeman”.

If the future of American isolationism is in doubt, there can be no doubting the ability of idealism to grow and prosper. Along with realism, Idealism has had a pronounced impact on policy making in the United States. Idealism can be seen as the application of standards of morality to foreign diplomacy. American often holds up standards of attainment or imitation, which may be unrealistic in the real world. One could argue that most American foreign policy rhetoric is idealistic. Idealism is used to sell Foreign Policy to Americans and the world. The Truman Doctrine was portrayed as a plan to formulate a safer democratic world in which people could live free of communist tyranny, its realist content was to contain Communism. The Gulf War was similarly portrayed although it was instead about the economics of oil. In a nation founded on and fought for the premise that “all men are created equal”, it remains the premise the US fights for, albeit twisted and manipulated to suit the politicians. In this sense, Idealism itself can be seen as a tool of foreign policy, as much as a political theory.

Whilst President Monroe's Doctrine is an example of early American idealism, although the theory of idealism is closely associated with President Woodrow Wilson. His rhetoric was moralistic, in his calls to make the world safe for democracy. To Wilson, W.W.I was a holy war. Wilson's rationale did not match the national interest, but the war was in America's national interest. Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech to Congress in January 1918 called for an end to the old balance of power system of international politics in favour of a new collective security system grounded in the League of Nations International Organisation. Wilson brought America out of isolationism, placing her as a world power. His rhetoric called the war a crusade to win over evil (evoking the good v evil dichotomy which would pervade forever in FP rhetoric).

Idealism stresses threats to global rather than national security. During the Cold War the idealists sought to universalise the humanitarian ideals and moral principles to which the United States aspired. They advocated support for international organisations, international law, arms control, human rights, and above all, democratic government. Idealists believed in the possibility of creating a more secure, prosperous and just world order, one compatible with American values.

The notion of collective security and the equality of nations was and is foreign to many nations, especially those as entrenched in the European balance of power system.  As a result European leaders and American Congressmen rejected idealism, in favour of political realism.  Congress felt that the national interest was more important than the moralistic notion of a League of Nations, devised under the Treaty of Versailles. This resulted in a foreign policy based on rational calculations of power and national interest. It was a policy based on Machiavellian principles of interest, prudence and expediency above morality. To realists, idealistic crusades were anathema. Realism, or Realpolitik stresses the expectation of conflict between states, not collaboration, the need to increase power relative to one's adversaries, the inadequacy of moral precepts as a guide to foreign affairs, and a distrust of others' motives. The intellectual tradition of political realism rejects moralism in foreign policy and assumes instead that survival is the nation's only acceptable ethical obligation. National power is the best route to its realization.

Realism has been most popular when international events seemed to confirm its pessimistic assumptions. In threatening eras policy makers typically found realism a comfortable worldview and concluded that America should pursue its self-interest with policies based on power calculations. The American preoccupation with geopolitical spheres of influence and military balances, and the equation of national power with military might, derived from the assumptions of realpolitik. Correspondingly, debates about military preparedness and related issues were cloaked in the language of realism. Morganthau was a believer in Realism and he felt that Alexander Hamilton had been also.  The prescription that America 'act realistically' by seeking power and maintaining international order through military strength and reasoned strategy attracted a large following. Even during the Cold War however, the concept of idealism survived as a viable concept. For 20 years, Wilsonian idealism had allowed American leaders to conduct their global role with missionary vigour.

Realism and idealism are continuing traditions in American diplomacy for they compete to define the nation's objectives. While one tradition may predominate in certain periods, as idealism did after 1915 and realism did after 1945, neither has ever dispelled the influence of the other. Thus American foreign policy traditionally encompasses both prudent realism and moral idealism. Each tradition responds to two indispensable needs; to protect the nation from external threats in a hostile world and to stand for ideals worthy of emulation. This duality accounts for Washington's ability to pursue seemingly contradictory foreign policy goals.

Today's climate of opinion continues to reflect both traditions. Particularly pronounced is the notion of American idealism in enlarging the community of democratic states. This sense of mission was rooted in American history by James Madison who wrote in 1792's "Universal Peace" that he looked forward to a "decline in the role played by war" and in "a revolution in the conduct of diplomacy".  This practice was continued under Woodrow Wilson and continues today. In 1994, Henry Kissinger wrote, "all of Wilson's successors have been Wilsonian to some degree, and subsequent American foreign policy has been shaped by his maxims."

For many years, American foreign policy has, in the words of Henry Kissinger, oscillated between an excessive concern with power and the total rejection of power." Liberal internationalists found their enthusiasm for democratic promotion on Wilson's thinking. However many realists also promote the goal of enlarging the circle of democratic states. Kissinger, himself a realist stated, "America must try to forge the widest possible moral consensus around a global commitment to democracy." His former boss, President Nixon, similarly stated, " our goal should be to enlarge free market democracy." Few would openly embrace the policies of Woodrow Wilson however. Only President Carter made a visible effort to embrace Wilsonianism, with his emphasis on human rights particularly in Us -Sino relations.  When this effort visibly failed, the policy was abruptly abandoned, and was from then on cloaked in more realistic language. Idealism is thriving in America today. President Bush urged a Wilsonian style of world leadership following the Gulf War when he heralded a "new world order" in which freedom and human rights would be upheld. Wilsonianism also implies American leadership in world affairs, and again Bush referred to the post Gulf War as an opportunity for America to lead the world in the direction of peace. Rhetoric in International Relations is rarely matched with idealistic actions however, and Bush’s vision of a New World Order was no exception.

Thus realists seem to have joined idealists in treating participatory democracy as a value on which American policy can now profitably be centred and whose expansion serves the nation's security interests. The Clinton Administration embraced such a notion, when the President declared in his 1994 State of the Union Address, "Democracies don't attack each other."  It could be therefore that a revolution is occurring with both realists and idealists coming to share a common conviction about the virtues of democratisation. This process has been aided by President Clinton's attempts to strengthen American power and position by pushing for worldwide acceptance of the democratic virtues that underpin America's liberal political culture. Bill Clinton's foreign policy is based on the Wilsonian tradition, promoting democracy, prosperity and enhancing security. Unlike Jimmy Carter however, Clinton has also played to the public mood by favouring a continued strong defence, consistent with realist thinking. The future of American foreign policy would appear to be dependent therefore on both realpolitik and idealism. For the moment however, as Henry Kissinger has declared, "Wilsonianism is triumphant."