National Power and the First Gulf War

With each day that passes, the 1990/91 Gulf War slips further into the past, and the details of the battle become more clouded in our minds. Only by vigilant re‑appraisals can we hope to remember what occurred in the desert, and to learn from the eventual outcome. The initial fighting lasted just forty days, yet the repercussions would and indeed still are, running to this day. This however is not the place to debate the intricate details of the war, but instead to address how the various elements of national power enabled the Western alliance to emerge victorious from Desert Storm.

For any serious investigation into a battle to be seen as comprehensive, it is perhaps necessary to begin at the source of tension, with the principle actors involved in the conflict. The popular press portrayed a battle of wits between Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces and George Bush’s American troops. In reality, the situation was a little more complex. Clearly Iraq was the principle aggressor as identified by the Western powers. Few countries stand alone in the face of international condemnation however. As the United Nations began to line up in opposition to Iraq’s hostility, King Hussein of Jordan refused to join the western coalition, gaining for himself the enmity of the West, which took time to heal. Also standing firm with Saddam was Yeoman and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, fronted by Yasser Arafat. Other than this group, which for so long was viewed as little more than a terrorist movement, the western alliance convinced most of the Arab states to join in their condemnation of Iraq.

Equal misunderstanding exists regarding the western alliance. In a war that was all too often portrayed as a personal battle between Baghdad and Washington, many lost sight of the fact that the forces battling Iraq were fighting under a mandate of the United Nations. The action in the Gulf received unprecedented support from the members of the United Nations Security Council. Even China was in favour although their support was always considered to be tentative. Problems existed of course, and no one state was more problematical than Israel. The United States had assembled an Arab coalition against Iraq, but this was strained by the mere thought of fighting side by side with Israel. “If Israel intervenes,” President Mubarak stated in the Independent of January 11, 1991, “Egypt will assume a different posture.”[i]

Ultimately, Israel remained out of the hostilities, and Egypt eventually sent 27,000 soldiers to Iraq, becoming the third largest contingent after America and Britain. Soon, some thirty‑five states from six continents, including America, France, Britain, Saudi Arabia and Russia were engaged in the UN-led confrontation which some have speculated will be the last ever large scale war between states.

Having identified the principle actors involved, it becomes necessary to compare their capabilities, using relevant elements of national power to explain the allied victory. As John Stoessinger remarks, our world is dominated by nation states, the existence of which depends upon a number of requirements, which can be seen as elements of the nation’s power. In his essay on the nation state, Stoessinger writes “it is frequently suggested that a nation’s power is simply the sum total of its capabilities”[ii] There are however other aspects to be considered. The varying national power of states may well dictate its standing in world affairs, and its level of perceived importance. There are a number of elements that pertain to any discussion of national power, though clearly some will be of greater relevance than others in this case study. All however will be discussed and equated in relation to the Gulf War of 1991.

The First element of national power is Geography. It has been written, “the most stable factor upon which the power of a nation depends is geography.”[iii] Hans Morganthau has gone so far as to suggest that America’s unique position in the world is due in large part to its status as an island. In the Gulf War, one of the distinguishing geographic features was the proximity of the fighting to the world’s oil reserves in the Middle East. Whilst Saddam’s naked aggression was clearly one reason for the allied action, the desire to protect the oil fields was perhaps an overriding concern to the West.

The Second element to consider is Natural Resources. On their own of course, natural resources are of questionable value, for it is the ability to develop and use resources that will determine the strength of a nation. The Gulf War is evidence of the fact that when a nation, or a group of nations has an “abundance of essential raw materials and an advanced industrial apparatus”[iv] they have a natural advantage. The Western allies were mainly industrial self‑sufficient nations. The Iraqi powers however had no support from outside the area, could not rely on its resources to feed its population and was ultimately unable to utilise the oil reserves with which it hoped to hold the west to ransom.       

The Third and fourth elements to be considered are the National Character and the National Morale. Such notions are complex, for whilst most would agree that “certain cultural patterns occur more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than another, it is almost impossible to agree on precisely what these common patterns are.”[v] Where stereotypes abound, distinguishing fact from fiction can be an arduous task. We must also consider the role of propaganda in the portrayal of the National Character and Morale. In the West of course, Saddam was shown with captured western children, promoting anger in the minds of the western populous and portraying Saddam as a coward. The Iraqis accused President Bush of being “the great Satan” Nether side is accurate of course, but news of Iraqi pilots fleeing to Iran, previously the Iraqi enemy; may give a clue to the true state of Iraqi morale and character.

The Fifth element of national power to consider is one of the most pertinent in this study, for it is Military Preparedness. The political control of the military in Britain is taken for granted, although in the United States, tension has risen due to the ascension of what President Eisenhower referred to as the “Military Industrial Complex”[vi] In the nuclear age, states have developed policies to emphasis the political uses of military power and ability.

During Operation Desert Storm 430,000 U.S. servicemen and 35,000 British soldiers were deployed in the Gulf along with three America aircraft carriers. Thousands of rolls of thin carbon fibre wire were dispersed over outdoor transformer stations by ship launched Tomahawk missiles. This secret new devise was used to ‘blind’ Iraqi defences to prevent them from launching missiles at allied bombers in the early stages of the campaign. This was the first ever use in war time of the BGM l09C Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from American war ships and over one hundred were launched on the first night of action.

The AWACS planes acted as airborne command posts during the hostilities, guiding the most successful precision bombing raids by the American Stealth fighters. B‑52 Bombers, F‑15E fighters, Tornado GR-­l fighters, Harrier Jump Jets, and Jaguar Jets were employed in the largest bombardment in history. 1,500 missions were flown on the first night alone, dropping 20,000 tonnes of bombs. In addition, the JP233 Runway Cratering Devise had devastating effects on Iraqi airfields. It is clear that the Iraqi forces were sorely equipped to deal with the dazzling arsenal that the U.N. forces had at their disposal. Even when Scud missiles were launched into Israel by Iraq to provoke an Israeli response that would breach the allied coalition, the American Patriot missiles were employed to shoot them down.

The Sixth aspect for our attention is population. As with the element of natural resource, the population aspect of national power needs to be examined in conjunction with other elements. As it has been pointed out “although very populous, neither China nor India was in the past considered very powerful.”[vii] Clearly in the Gulf War, the thirty‑six nation alliance had a far greater population to call upon than Iraq, Jordan and the P.L.O. could muster. The Seventh area to consider is that of Industrial    Capacity. It is in connection with Industrial capacity that population gains its importance. Nations engaged in demographic transition are those where “industrialisation leads to an increase in population which in turn leads to further industrialisation.”[viii] Whilst it is certainly true that Iraq’s Industrial Capacity is increasing and that many were concerned that they would gain a nuclear capability, their strength was far below that of the western alliance.

The penultimate element for our consideration is the quality of the nation’s diplomacy. As John Garnett reveals, “it was never true that diplomacy ended when the shooting started, but in the pre-nuclear age there did seem some sense in the view that war was an alternative to diplomacy.”[ix] Diplomacy is the tool of foreign policy designed to manage international relations. With regard to the Gulf War, America’s chief diplomat, Secretary of State James Baker was seen to be instrumental in forming the coalition that eventually entered into the fiery arena of war. His efforts compared with the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nation struggle to justify his nation’s aggression and to decry the American led effort to free Kuwait.

The final element of national power to be addressed is the quality of the national Government. Many would assume that greater national strength is provided by democratic administrations, although the historical record as such is mixed. Totalitarian regimes have been able to manipulate their population through psychological indoctrination and propaganda. Examples include China and Nazi Germany. Leadership in national government is of course an essential aspect of any debate on elements of national power, for all other resources are rendered worthless if not used to optimum effect. In the Gulf War instance, it should be clear that the western allies had a far superior quality of national, and indeed under the United Nations, international government. The forces of democracy were seen to have triumphed in the face of tyranny, and totalitarianism.

Operation Desert Storm lasted for just forty days, and was viewed immediately as a success. The outcome of the war was far less complete and clear-cut than many at the time believed, and many have come to question the need for war at all. Many see the Kuwaiti Royal family as one of the most corrupt in the Middle East. The Iraqi infrastructure has been destroyed; thousands of Kurds have been driven into exile, yet Saddam appears to be more secure in power than ever. Was the Mother of all Battles such a victory? Despite the ambiguous result that allowed Saddam to remain in control of Iraq, the war was certainly a success for the west and one that needed to be fought. As President Kennedy stated in 1962, “the 1930s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war.”[x] The United Nations mandate clearly defined the rules of engagement and limited the action to removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait, not the removal of Saddam from Iraq. If, as Stoessinger states, “power in international relations is the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behaviour of other nations”[xi] then it is clear that the elements of national power herein described played a substantial role in the victory over Saddam in the Mother of all Battles.