America’s Dirty Little Secret

A study of US/Iraqi relations reveals a policy of hypocrisy, double standards and a preparedness to exploit the events of September 11 for preconceived political ambitions. It also appears apparent that much of the recent action has been taken to cover the tracks of senior members of the current administration and to rectify the record of the current President’s father.

George W. Bush’s first effort in this concealment was on November 1, 2001, when he signed Executive Order 13233, which placed great restrictions on access to his father’s presidential papers. This event received little media attention, although there is a report on it at The American Political Science Association web site. American historian Anna Nelson has said, "This order sets up a minefield in front of what was a straightforward piece of legislation.”

This sits in stark contrast to Bill Clinton’s decision to waive his right to restrict access to most of his presidential papers. When one considers that the next series of papers to be released all relate to the era when Bush’s father served as Vice President and President, it raises a logical question of what is being kept from the public domain? Another question is how are President Bush and Defence Secretary Rumsfeld so certain that Iraq possess weapons of mass destruction, given the inconclusive nature of the UN weapons inspectors' findings?

Iraq and Previous Administrations

Though much derided, the Carter Administration strove to make great strides in terms of Middle East Peace, with the signing of the Camp David Accords being the highlight of the administration. Then came the Iranian revolution, an event that would lead to Carter’s downfall and to the start of America’s shady healings with Iraq.

The taking of Americans hostages and the fear of Islamic fundamentalism became the driving force behind an American policy that would taint three U.S. administrations. There was a genuine fear of Islam in Washington as a force that was alien to American thinking; indeed military leaders at the Pentagon became more concerned about Islam than about Communism. This fear led to a mentality that any means were viable to defeat the advance of Islamic fundamentalism. The most viable tool would be Iraq, which was began an 8 year war with Iran, following a failed Iranian attempt in April 1980 to assassinate Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz.

Few in Washington had any illusions about Saddam Hussein. Harold Brown, Carter's Secretary of Defence said, “The intelligence reports all said he was a thug and an assassin.” Members of the National Security Council said of Saddam: "This was a man who was ruthless and dangerous, but who nonetheless was a man you could do business with.” However, National Security Adviser Brzezinski "talked quite openly, saying that Iraq provided a counterbalance to the Iranians, and we should cultivate that.” The American policy was a simple one; the enemy of my enemy is my friend. 

However, by the spring of 1982, Iraq stood on the brink of defeat. The Iranians had discovered a gap in the Iraqi defences and prepared a massive invasion force that would have cut off Baghdad from Basra and could have resulted in Iraq’s defeat. Officially the United States was neutral in the conflict, but now President Reagan was forced to choose between maintaining strict neutrality and allowing an Iranian victory, or intervening and providing assistance to Iraq. Reagan decided that America could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war.

However on November 1, 1983, Secretary of State Shultz, was informed of “almost daily use of chemical weapons by Iraq.” Despite this, the decision to side with Iraq was enshrined in National Security Decision Directive 114, dated November 26, 1983, a document that remains classified to this day. The Directive outlined America’s priorities as being the ability to project military force in the Persian Gulf and to protect oil supplies, without reference to chemical weapons or human rights concerns. Ultimately America should do "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran.

Indeed, the United States was giving aid and weapons to both Iran and Iraq with the understanding, as Henry Kissinger put it, “that it’s best to let them kill each other off.” Ultimately it was felt that, “oil is too valuable a commodity to be left in the hands of the Arabs.” To gain a greater understanding of the situation on the ground, Reagan sent an envoy to meet with the Iraqi leadership. The envoy first met with Tariq Aziz, whom he told. “While there were a number of differences of view between us, we also see a number of areas of common interest.” Aziz told Reagan’s envoy that he would find Saddam “a thoughtful man who analysed and learned from experience.”

The State Department were adamant that “the greatest benefit of the visit would be the establishment of direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein.” Therefore, Reagan provided his special envoy with a hand-written letter to be given to Saddam. The letter has not been released, but it contained a clear message that Washington wanted to restore normal relations, which had been severed in 1967 during the Arab-Israeli War.

So it was that in December 1983, Reagan’s Special Envoy presented his credentials to the Iraqi leader. He shook Saddam’s hand, called him “Mr. President,” presented the Iraqi leader not only with Reagan’s hand-written letter, but also a pair of golden cowboy spurs, as a gift from Reagan. They then proceeded to have a meeting that the Iraqi foreign ministry described as being about “topics of mutual interest.” The Special Envoy was Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld reiterated to Saddam America’s belief that “The U.S. and Iraq shared interests in preventing Iranian and Syrian expansion.” He said the U.S. was urging other states to curtail arms sales to Iran and believed it had successfully closed off exports by third countries. Ultimately, Rumsfeld believed that America and Iraq both sought  “regional peace and stability.”

The State Department asked Rumsfeld to note that whilst America hoped for a peaceful solution to the Iran-Iraq war, “The United States government recognizes Iraq’s current disadvantage in a war of attrition, since Iran has access to the Gulf while Iraq does not, and would regard any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as strategic defeat for the west,” a clear indication of which side the U.S. was prepared to support.

Rumsfeld did note that United States “efforts to assist were inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us.” In fact, the United States knew that Iraq has used poison gas against Iranian troops a few months before and was building its own chemical weapons infrastructure. Rumsfeld has said he had "nothing to do" with helping Iraq in its war against Iran. In September 2002 Rumsfeld said, "I cautioned him about the use of chemical weapons and discussed a host of other things."

That claim does not tally with the State Department note of his meeting, at which Rumsfeld stated the Reagan administration was so concerned about an Iranian victory that it offered Saddam unspecified assistance. “I indicated our desire to have the war mediated and ended peacefully without further escalating tension in the Middle East” Rumsfeld made clear that U.S. interests coincided with Iraq’s in the war. “We would not want Iran’s influence expanded at the expense of Iraq. As with all sovereign nations, we respect Iraq’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Whilst Rumsfeld was a private citizen when he was appointed Middle East envoy and was not one of the architects of the Reagan administration's tilt toward Iraq, documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S./Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Iraqi leaders described themselves as "extremely pleased" with the Rumsfeld visit, which had "elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level."

Following Rumsfeld’s trip, the U.S renewed ties, provided intelligence and aid to ensure Iraq would not be defeated by Iran. National Security Decision Directive 139 of April 5, 1984, focused on increased access for U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf and enhanced intelligence-gathering capabilities. The directive orders preparation of "a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse."

Just so there is not doubt as to the origins of Saddam’s arsenal, we have the testimony of Reagan’s Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for International Economic Trade and Security Policy, Stephen Bryen. He was responsible for preventing the transfer of sensitive technology to potential enemies. In 1986 Bryen learned of an application to export advanced computer technology, manufactured in New Jersey, to a research facility in Iraq, for use in the development of a ballistic missile. Bryen raised his concerns with the Commerce Department, but was over-ruled.

Paul Freedenberg, then the Under Secretary for Export Administration, insists that there were no grounds for stopping the transaction. "At the time, the State Department had no particular concerns in this area, so the policy of President Reagan was normal trade with Iraq." 

While the transfer of purely military items was banned, sales of "dual use" technology, with both civilian and military applications, were reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Since 1986 sales of American goods to Iraq have totalled more than $1.5 billion. All the while, other nations, including France, were selling weapons to Saddam, without opposition from Washington as the U.S. was obsessed with making sure of an Iraqi victory. Bryen is adamant that America  "created this monster. If you want to know who's to blame for all this, we are, because we let all this stuff go to Iraq."

By the spring of 1990 however, changes were afoot. Saddam had threatened to incinerate half of Israel if attacked. He moved Scud missiles to the border with Jordan, within striking range of Israel. He railed against the long- established U.S. naval presence in the gulf. He even attempted to smuggle in triggering devices used in nuclear weapons. In the midst of these developments, six U.S. Senators, including Bob Dole and Alan Simpson, arrived in Iraq on a fact-finding mission. Their meeting with Saddam drew much attention after Baghdad released a partial transcript of the conversation. Simpson, in particular, came off badly: "I believe that your problems lie with the Western media and not with the U.S. government," he advised Saddam.

On July 25, a week before Iraq invaded Kuwait, and as troops stood on the border, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Glaspie was summoned to a meeting with Saddam, where she told him, "We don't have much to say about Arab-Arab differences, like your border difference with Kuwait." Glaspie was severely criticized for her remarks, which were seen by many as having given Saddam a green light for invasion. Indeed, the US Ambassador assured Saddam that President Bush “wanted better and deeper relations”. According to an Iraqi transcript of the conversation reprinted in the Washington Post, Glaspie told Saddam Hussein, "President Bush is an intelligent man, He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq."

News reports from across the political spectrum, from the Washington Post, to the London times, from Time Magazine to CNN, from CBS to the Guardian, all report and confirm the fact that America embraced Saddam Hussein despite the knowledge that he had invaded Iran, had long-range nuclear aspirations that would "probably" include "an eventual nuclear weapon capability," harboured known terrorists in Baghdad, abused the human rights of his citizens, and possessed and used chemical weapons on Iranians and his own people.

As reported in The Guardian on December 31, 2002, Rick Francona, an ex-army intelligence lieutenant colonel who served in the US embassy in Baghdad from 1987-88, declared, "We believed the Iraqis were using mustard gas all through the war, but that was not as sinister as nerve gas. They started using nerve gas as early as '83 or '84, but in a very limited way. They were probably figuring out how to use it. And in '88, they developed sarin." This is nothing new of course, during the 1990s, congress held two inquiries into US arms sales to Iraq, in 1992 and again in 1994. At the opening of the second round of hearings, the Chairman and Ranking Member Alphonse D'Amato released a detailed report that constituted a searing indictment of U.S. arms export policies during the Reagan/Bush Administrations.

Counterpunch revealed that Donald Rumsfeld has recently said, "We would not be facing the problems in Iraq today if the technologically advanced countries of the world had seen the danger and strictly enforced the economic sanctions against Iraq." However, he could not have been unaware of the Congressional hearings and the numerous press reports linking the US to arms sales to Iraq.

The Washington Post revealed on December 30, 2002 that Rumsfeld's trip to Baghdad had opened the floodgates for lucrative U.S. weapons exports, totalling $1.5 billion. This included chemical/biological and nuclear weapons equipment and technology, along with critical components for missile delivery systems for all of the above. The Times, on December 31, 2002 reported the contents of a 1994 General Accounting Office Report, revealing some 771 weapons export licenses for Iraq were approved during a six-year period, not by European allies, but by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

There were few, if any reservations evident in the range of weapons which President Ronald Reagan, and his successor George W. H. Bush were willing to sell Saddam Hussein. According to the hearing, among the chemical weapons that America sold to Iraq were Sarin, VX and Mustard Gas. Some of the powerful biological agents sold included anthrax, bubonic plague and Botulinum.

The Director of the CIA's Non-Proliferation Centre testified that, between 1984 and 1990, the CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research issued five alert memos "covering Iraqi's dealings with United States firms on purchases, discussions, or visits that appeared to be related to weapons of mass destruction programs." These memos were sent to Commerce, Justice, and Treasury. The FBI then collected intelligence indicating that U.S. firms were involved in possible violations of U.S. law.

The Director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control testified that the Commerce Department licensed U.S. companies to ship such items directly to Iraqi plants, long suspected to be used for the development of a ballistic missile programme. 40 U.S. companies were involved in such sales of critical equipment such as missile guidance systems, navigational radar, high-speed computers and filling systems designed to load Chemical and Biological agents in missiles. Such equipment was being sent to Iraq until late 1989 less than a year before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait!

The warnings were falling on deaf ears: in October, 1989, 10 months before the Kuwait invasion, President George Bush signed NSD 26, updating NSDD 114, and again committing the U.S. to normal relations with Saddam Hussein's government.

As the primary recipients of the memos from the CIA the Reagan/Bush administrations were fully aware of the use to which the equipment as being put, and of the security implications this raised, but decided to turn a blind eye to the export of such technology.

Following Bush’s defeat in the 1992 election, the Republicans did not remain silent. Instead they formed the Project for a New American Century. The member of this organisation will appear familiar, as they now constitute much of the current administration: Richard Armitage, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. In January 1998 they wrote to the President, Bill Clinton arguing “the policy of “containment” of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding,” and that a new strategy should be developed that would “aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power.” Therefore, well before Osama bin Laden attacked the World Trade Centre, an agenda for war against Iraq had been building steam in Republican circles.

The current US mobilization is the culmination of planning that has been ongoing throughout the 1990s. A number of sources have reported upon the drive to link the events of September 11 to Iraq, attempts spearheaded by Rumsfeld. Bob Woodwood covers this in detail in his latest book, Bush at War, but the major news networks also pickled up on it.

CBS covered it well. “Five hours after a plane ploughed into the Pentagon, Donald Rumsfeld was telling his aides to come up with plans for striking Iraq. With the intelligence all pointing toward bin Laden, Rumsfeld ordered the military to begin working on strike plans. Notes quote Rumsfeld as saying he wanted "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit Saddam Hussein at same time. Not only bin Laden. "Go massive," the notes quote him as saying. "Sweep it all up. Things related and not."

In 1991, the American comedian Bill Hicks rightly commented, “We (America) are the bullies of the world. We’re arming the world and we armed Iraq. During the Gulf War those intelligence reports would come out detailing Iraq’s incredible weapons. How did we know that?  We looked at the receipts.” 

The story of U.S. involvement with Saddam Hussein in the years before his 1990 attack on Kuwait is a topical example of the underside of U.S. foreign policy, in which deals can be struck with dictators, human rights violations overlooked, and accommodations made with arms proliferators, all on the staggeringly simplistic principle that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.”