The Special Relationship 1945-1960

Theoretically speaking, the United States of America deals with her North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies as equals. Some however, are dealt with more equally than others, and the most equal of all is Great Britain. For over five decades, Britain has nurtured a partnership of unparalleled trust with the United States of America, referred to by successive generations of politicians as the ‘Special Relationship’. This has been one of the few constants in an ever-changing world. With the increasingly amiable tone of the Twentieth Century, members of the Diplomatic Service have a tradition of operating together and on a number of occasions, “American diplomats have turned first to ascertain Britain’s reaction, before evaluating matters of international consequence.”[i]

How this relationship has developed from a wartime alliance of equals, to what has been referred to, as a ‘patron-client’ association is a matter for debate and speculation. Much is made of our shared language, yet few crave such a relationship with Canada or Australia. Equally, America’s ethnic diversity quashes talk of any cultural indebtedness. Undoubtedly there is a uniqueness to Anglo-American relations, but its raison d’être should be sought in the passage of history, rather than in any shared heritage. As Henry Kissinger declared, the relationship is based on “the value of intangibles, and the ability to communicate informally.”[ii]

The formative years of the Forties and Fifties saw the ascension of America and the decline of the United Kingdom, as the cost of modern war bankrupted the once mighty Empire. Britain had entered the Twentieth Century with the greatest Empire the world had ever seen. However, “World War One cost Britain 750,000 lives and $35.3 billion, only Germany paid a higher price.”[iii] After the brief interlude of peace, the Second World War altered power relationships throughout the globe and “Britain finally and unalterably slipped from the ranks of the leading nation states, into a secondary position.”[iv]

The United States had begun the Forties embroiled in isolationism. Leading figures such as Charles Lindbergh and Joseph P. Kennedy called for America to distance herself from England, who had “not a Chinaman’s chance and would go down fighting”[v] in a war with Germany. It was however, America’s involvement in the war which increased her role in world affairs, emerging as the only “outright victor of the war”[vi] The term “Special Relationship” was first brought to prominence by Winston Churchill during the ‘Iron Curtain’ speech, delivered at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. He declared that the only certain way to prevent war in the future was through a “fraternal association of English speaking peoples.”[vii] Winston Churchill understood that whilst Britain could no longer dominate world affairs, an Anglo-American Alliance could be all-powerful. His concerns over the loss of sovereignty were countered by the realisation “the weaker of the two, if older and more experienced can have great sway in the union.”[viii]

The collapse of Europe presented America with a dilemma; American security and independence required that the United Sates establish a balance of power in the European interior. During the Nineteenth Century, the British Navy had carried out this task. “Now that Britain’s power had declined drastically, the United States would have to carry out the task alone.”[ix] The American prescription for Europe’s ills was a massive injection of dollars included in the Marshall Plan. American aid however was made conditional on the economic cooperation among the European states. In official American opinion therefore, “European integration became both the prerequisite for Europe’s recovery and the necessary basis for Europe’s long term prosperity.”[x] Washington’s patronage did not come for free. American aid was viewed somewhat differently in Moscow. “The new course of American foreign policy meant a return to the old anti-Soviet course, designed forcibly to institute world domination by Britain and the United States.”[xi]

From this quotation, it appears that the Soviets had not fully realised the extent to which Britain had fallen from her pre-war eminence, and clearly viewed the Anglo-American alliance as a partnership of equals. Europeans however, were not slow to realise that the Marshall Plan by itself would not be enough to save the continent. Across Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was imposing its might upon nation after nation; engineering a coup d’etat in Czechoslovakia and imposing a blockade in Berlin. “In short, it became clear that a prerequisite for Europe’s recovery was military security.”[xii] By 1949, the United States Senate considered Britain the corner stone of America’s North Atlantic defence strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to their client, Great Britain, as the last line of defence, a must hold position against a Soviet invasion of the Rhineland. “British military planners agreed with their patrons that the Continent was expendable as long as America was willing to defend Britain.”[xiii]

The domino theory was a major American concern throughout the Cold War, and it was taken as seriously in Europe as it was in South East Asia. Just as during the Second World War American anti-colonialism was tempered by a desire to defeat fascism; now during the Cold War, American Imperial concerns were muted by the necessity to contain the spread of communism. The United States began to approve of British counter-insurgency in the Third World since communists usually led the insurgents. The value of the British Empire to the Americans at this time is revealed in Kim Philby’s memoirs. “Whenever we want to subvert any place” an American officer quipped, “we find that the British own an island within easy reach.”[xiv]

Here it is clear that the client was assisting the patron in its drive toward super power status.  Britain’s standing with America during the early 1950s was sustained primarily due to President Eisenhower’s deference to Winston Churchill. He felt however, that the old British Prime Minister was “trying to relive the days of World War Two.”[xv] As President, Eisenhower wrote, “any hope of establishing such a relationship is completely fatuous.”[xvi] In his diaries Eisenhower portrays Winston Churchill as being “on the verge of senility.”[xvii] As Churchill’s health deteriorated, so did Britain’s status in the special relationship. It was the lack of equilibrium that would result in the development of a ‘patron-client’ relationship.

If there was one single incident that best highlights the true nature of the relationship, then it was perhaps the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. Britain and France sought to re-take the Canal that had been nationalised by Egyptian leader Nasser. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden felt that in their self-appointed roles of international policemen, the Anglo-French actions would be welcomed. In America, President Eisenhower agreed with Eden’s assessment of Nasser’s ambitions but could not understand why Eden was so blind to the inherent dangers of military action. The President was not about to commit American ground forces to Egypt in an election year and was aware that the required Congressional consent would not be forthcoming. The patron was simply refusing to help the client. Viewing the situation, Eisenhower warned Eden that an assault would fail. Eden resented the lack of American support but was determined to make his own mistakes. He and the French agreed to keep the Americans out of the equation.

Eisenhower’s political expediency and Eden’s determination to fight was “leading to a serious misunderstanding between the United Kingdom and the United States.”[xviii] Ultimately, hostilities were only ended by a Cabinet mutiny following the American threat to withdraw their much-needed support for sterling. “The Special Relationship had been deliberately ruptured.”[xix] Later the broken figure of Anthony Eden, symbolic of Britain’s reduced status in the world, wrote to President Eisenhower, “I believe as firmly as ever that the future of us all depends on the closest Anglo- American cooperation.”[xx]

The whole affair however, merely proved to Eisenhower that the British Empire was no more, and that her days of great influence were over. “By October 1957, the greatest Empire the world had ever seen had sunk beneath the waves it once ruled.”[xxi] From now on, “Britain’s role had been reduced to that of an aircraft carrier, a staging post for American planes on bombing raids to Moscow.”[xxii] Regardless of how Eden and Macmillan might try to fool themselves, this was no longer an equal partnership. Eisenhower saw Britain’s ultimate choice as coming down to either joining a United States of Europe, or becoming the 49th State in the American Union. Britain would be welcomed as an ally, but this was not like it was in World War Two. Eden had sacrificed Britain’s role as a world power by refusing to accept that notions of  “empire mattered less than Britain’s special relationship with the United States, for Britain was now a second class power.”[xxiii] Eisenhower’s reference to the Suez Crisis as a “family spat”[xxiv] suggests the recognition and affirmation of the closeness of the relationship. It also depicts the whole affair as a irritant, whereas for the British it was little short of cataclysmic.

During the Nineteen Fifties, Britain lacked the means with which to remain in the top rank of word powers. This decline was emphasised by its weaker economic performance compared to its main competitors at the time. The British were eager to reject such notions of inferiority however, and in their Global Strategy Paper of 1952, realised the need for a nuclear deterrent. Priority was given to the production of the V-Bomber, to demonstrate that Britain remained a great power “qualitatively superior to the medium sized states, and did not wish to be absolutely dependent upon the American nuclear umbrella.”[xxv] The British involvement in the creation of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and her participation in the Central Treaty Organisation could be seen in retrospect as “the search for handholds by a country sliding downhill.”[xxvi]

Many began to realise that the notion of a special relationship would not be, as Churchill had dreamed, an arrangement between equals, but instead, “the judicious use of the old imperial power’s global assets to influence the new superpower.”[xxvii] What then characterises the relationship? If we can dismiss the significance of a common language and culture, what remains? The Special Relationship is built upon a wide range of agreements, on essential national security assumptions and upon specific policies. The relationship has developed through a number of official, semi-official and un-official contacts. Some of these are institutionalised, such as NATO or United Nations Resolutions. Others however, are made at a personal level between Presidents and Prime Ministers. Perhaps the primary characteristic of the special relationship has been the role of Britain as America’s most trusted and loyal aide. In the years that have followed the Second World War, Britain has retained this role. As a result, the United States has consistently consulted more closely and more fully with British governments about NATO affairs than with any other.  

The closeness of the relationship provides greater opportunities for British influence, than are available to other west European states. By working close together at a range of governmental levels, the United States has established a pecking order among its NATO allies and given Britain the pride of second place. British governments have gained from the special relationship; fuller intelligence briefings, Polaris and Trident, but the unsurprising truth about influence is that it flows mainly from Washington to London. Only rarely therefore can a British government exercise the role foreseen at the outset of the relationship, of offering “calm wisdom to moderate clumsy American eagerness.”[xxviii]

Special as the relationship may be, it does not of itself give Britain the opportunity to influence American policy. The client must remember who the patron is, and that power now resides in Washington, DC not in London. There are therefore costs involved, for this is a client relationship. The client is rewarded for providing loyalty, and Britain was consistently proven such loyalty. The relationship does not demand that Britain answer Washington’s clarion calls on every occasion and Britain’s refusal to become embroiled in Vietnam is an example of this. It is arguable that the illusion of influence in Washington is the greatest cost of the special relationship. It created a mental block against joining the EEC from the 1950’s until the 1970’s. “It still creates delusions of grandeur. As long as they are useful to Washington, so long will they be encouraged.”[xxix]