America's Place in the World

Throughout the Twentieth Century, the United States saw an inexorable rise in its place in the world, as it attained the position of “the world’s indispensable nation.”[i] As the British Empire crumbled, so America was in the ascendancy: its politics, culture and media grew, apparently at an exponential rate, to dominate the globe. Now, at the dawn of the Third Millennium, her position is being called into question, by her own actions and by the actions of others. Where has “The American Century”[ii] positioned the USA with respect to the rest of the world?

The first attempt to define America’s place in the world pre-dates the republic. It was Thomas Paine in his text, Common Sense who sowed the earliest seeds of an isolationist stance, declaring, “It is in the interest of America to steer clear of Europe.”[iii] A nation born in the conflict of Revolutionary War actively sought to avoid future conflict. James Madison wrote in 1792's Universal Peace that he looked forward to a “decline in the role played by war” and in “a revolution in the conduct of diplomacy.”[iv] Nineteenth Century American leaders also avoided the European balance of power system, choosing instead to concentrate on the urgent task of rebuilding the nation after the Civil War. Such thinking dictated that perfecting democracy at home and acting as a beacon for mankind best served American interests. It also indicated that America’s values imposed an obligation to crusade for them around the world, in search of a perfect future. Such thinking can still be distilled in the beliefs of many Americans as we enter the Third Millennium. Despite a commitment to avoid such alliances, the United States had long taken an interest in the Western Hemisphere, with the issuing of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, and its participation in the Spanish-American War.

For many years, America’s place in the world has fluctuated between a concentration on the acquisition of power and attempts to reject the responsibility of power. Such sentiment goes a long way in explaining the American dilemma of how best to engage the rest of the world. Happily, whilst an isolationist stance is often present in America, a penchant for internationalism has always been just as apparent and is most evident in efforts to transplant American values around the globe. America has long seen herself as having a special mission in the world, viewing herself as innocent and virtuous in the midst of a tainted world. Indeed, according to Arthur Schlesinger, American isolationism does not involve American secession from the rest of the world, but rather a rejection of commitments to other states, to avoid what Jefferson referred to as “entangling alliances.”[v] Whilst the debate between interventionists and isolationists has never been fully resolved, a cycle of behaviour appears to have emerged, with each policy taking a political generation to run its course. This is a prime example of what Arthur Schlesinger refers to as “the cycles of American history.”[vi]

A turning point in America’s place in the world came with the election of Woodrow Wilson, under whom a sense of American idealism was allowed to grow and prosper. Wilsonian idealism has had a pronounced impact on the United States and upon her role in the world. America has often been accused of holding up standards of attainment or imitation, which may be unrealistic in the real world and such accusations invariably found their personification in Woodrow Wilson, who sought to ensure the application of standards of morality to foreign diplomacy. In 1994, Henry Kissinger wrote, “it is above all to the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency and continues to march to this day.”[vii] 

Realism and idealism are continuing traditions in American diplomacy for they compete to define the nation's objectives. Whilst one tradition may predominate in certain periods, as idealism did after 1915 and realism did after 1945, neither has ever dispelled the influence of the other. Thus American foreign policy traditionally encompasses both prudent realism and moral idealism. Each tradition responds to two indispensable needs; to protect the nation from external threats in a hostile world and to stand for ideals worthy of emulation. This duality accounts for Washington's ability to pursue seemingly contradictory foreign policy goals.

However after the First World War, America saw a return to Warren Harding’s  “normalcy”[viii] and for many years this was the status of America’s place in the world: neutral, disarmed, unready and unable to lead the world. The outbreak of World War Two would change that and would propel the United States to its position of pre-eminent power, in what Stephan Ambrose referred to as her “rise to Globalism.”[ix] Following a global conflict that shattered the empires of Japan and Great Britain, only the United States was left with an economy intact and a relatively untouched homeland. The result of deals struck before and during the war resulted in the United States emerging from the conflict as the only power in the world capable of resisting the monolithic power of the Soviet Union. However, with the dawn of the jet age and the introduction of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, the long-standing belief in America’s invulnerability to foreign attack was bought into sharp focus.

In the decades following the Second World War, America’s place in the world would be defined by her response to the Soviet threat that came to overshadow the remainder of the century. Those 50 years would witness the globalisation of American power as it sought to defend freedom not only on its own shores, but also far from home on foreign lands. America’s place in the world came to be defined as much by her reaction to foreign states, as it was by her own actions. Through Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua and numerous other Cold War flash points, the United States viewed its position in the world through its self-proclaimed mission to “defend freedom in its hour of maximum danger.”[x] This was not necessarily a mission they had sought, but rather “we in this country, in this generation are, by destiny rather than choice, the watchmen on the walls of freedom.”[xi] Not only was America now faced with military engagement, but also the risks of an unstable global economic environment. As the world grew smaller, so America became dependent upon foreign trade and currency exchanges.

During the 1990s America’s place in the world went through a revolution all of its own, as the collapse of the USSR left America as the world’s sole super-power. However, just as the world had to readjust to the decline in power of the former Soviet republics, so it also had to consider the new role of the US as a world hyper power. It achieved this status at a precipitous moment, just as a new president was intent on forging a domestic revival rather than international expansionism. For Bill Clinton, it would be the “economy, stupid,”[xii] not the fate of the world, that would dominate.

However, rather than withdraw from the world, as many feared, Clinton sought instead to reposition America in a world that Kissinger noted, “America…(could) neither dominate nor retreat (from)”[xiii] Clinton’s unheralded triumph was to place America at the centre of the world’s economic trading blocs, a role that may seem logical now, but which was far from certain in 1991. By doing so, Clinton ensured that the US remained the world’s “essential nation,”[xiv] a vital link between east and west, north and south, and the powerhouse of the global economy, ensuring passage of NAFTA and ratification of the GATT deal.

Under Clinton, America’s place in the world was defined by both prudent realism and moral idealism, designed to protect the nation from external threats and to stand for ideals worthy of emulation. This duality accounted for America’s ability to represent seemingly contradictory positions in an age when many questioned whether America should remain a global power or should assume a less ambitious posture. President Clinton remained committed to American activism, claiming that America must “fulfil our responsibility as the world's sole super-power.”[xv] Like President Bush before him, Bill Clinton readily accepted America’s position as the remaining super- power and sought to use his nation’s status in attempts to expand NATO. American envoys brokered deals in Haiti and Bosnia, whilst Operation Vigilant Warrior kept Kuwait free. American duality was expressed by the President himself, declaring “America cannot turn her back on the world” whilst simultaneously stating, “America cannot be the world’s policeman.”[xvi] Clinton had little doubt however, that the Twenty-First Century would become the second American Century.[xvii]

With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, there was reason to believe that America’s role in the world would remain essentially as it was before, with little new initiatives in foreign policy or any revolution in economic policy. As Bush was sworn in, America and the world were in a position all but unimaginable just a decade before. Rather than living on the brink of nuclear war, in a bipolar international system, Bush took power in the midst of a unipolar world, apparently free from the deadly rivalry of the Cold War. It was a period that did not long endure. The attacks of September 11, 2001 produced a seismic shift in the role America would play in the world at the dawn of the Third Millennium.

The attacks challenged President Bush to reposition America in the world. He would not be content with basking in historically high opinion ratings, or in the warmth of global sympathies. For Bush, September 11 was a clarion call to right the wrongs of the Cold War, to end the tradition of coddling tyrants as long as they sang America’s song. The nation found itself in the aftermath of the attacks of being in a position of great strength and yet also great sympathy, not a usual occurrence. In that moment it had the opportunity to do great things, to indeed herald a Second American Century. By accepting the sympathies of the world and by turning that emotion into positive action that could have bound the nations of the world together against terror, the United States could have demonstrated true benevolence and foresight. However the attacks on New York and Washington produced a wave of sympathy for the United States that the current administration has proved singularly unable to transform into popular support for its current policies. By moving into Iraq, the nation has squandered its inheritance of compassion. Under Bush, the assertive multilateralism of Clinton has been replaced by a determined unilateralism, cloaked by a scant “coalition of the willing.”[xviii] His moves in Afghanistan appeared to be considered and met with support; his moves into Iraq, long sought by the Project for a New American Century, were less welcomed and would prove contentious. However, it is this move that will define the role of America in the world for the duration of the Bush Administration.

Less than two years before the events of September11, President Clinton spoke of the coming of a second American Century. In the wake of the attacks of September 11, many questioned the continuing validity of such a sentiment. However, the idea of a second American Century was not abandoned in the wake of the Al-Qaeda assault; rather, the attack served as a catalyst for a reinvigorated, arguably more fundamentalist campaign for Americanism around the world. The policy of pre-emption has redefined America’s role in the world as a moral super-power, hell-bent upon exporting American exceptionalism to a global audience. Manifest Destiny brought American values to a continent in the Nineteenth Century. From Manifest Destiny to Wilsonianism through to Kennedy’s New Frontier, all encompassed the notion of “America” as the embodiment of universal values.[xix] Now Bush seems intent on a global Manifest Destiny for this generation of Americans

In his speeches and in his comments, President Bush has painted a world of black and white, of good guys and bad guys. By establishing a clash of civilisations, Bush has removed the all-important middle ground and in a world of grey, black and white may be bold but will always be viewed as extreme. [xx] In this campaign, there is no middle ground, no possibility of disagreement on detail with the US strategy, for such disagreement would be interpreted as a betrayal of “good” ideology. As Bush declared in January 2002, “We need not be focused on one person, because we're fighting for freedom and civilized civilization.”[xxi]

However, President Bush has gone out of his way to promote America as a friend to peoples of all faiths and of Muslims in particular. “We do not fight a religion,”[xxii] the President has declared, and his government, aware that so much of America’s place in the world is dictated by the image it projects via the media, has used all the tools at its discretion to advance its cause, including hiring advertising guru Charlotte Beers to serve as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Beers was renowned for her campaigns for Uncle Ben's rice and American Express. She claimed she would “really connect with the hearts and minds of those people.”[xxiii] Secretary of State Colin Powell declared the appointment of Charlotte Beers was an attempt  “to change from just selling the U.S. to really branding foreign policy.”[xxiv] That would be done, he added, by “branding the department, marketing the department, marketing American values to the world, and not just putting out pamphlets.”[xxv]

To some it was a bold new step, to others, an admission of failure. Yet the questions and doubts run deep. “How is it that the country that invented Hollywood and Madison Avenue has such trouble promoting a positive image of itself overseas?”[xxvi] asked Rep. Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee. Osama Siblani, publisher of the Arab American News, however feels that America lost the battle for hearts and minds long ago. “They could have the prophet Muhammad doing public relations and it wouldn't help.”[xxvii]

America’s cultural place in the world was not gone unaffected by the events of September 11. Musicians, actors, film producers, television and radio shows have all been affected. Shortly after the attacks, top Hollywood executives met with Karl Rove, George W. Bush’s chief political advisor, to discuss how the film industry could contribute to the “war on terrorism.” Despite the history of antagonism between the worlds of entertainment and politics, “there was a seamless web of unity that was really quite affectionate to behold,”[xxviii] said Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, himself a former White House adviser under President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Television shows were among the first to be affected and whilst the creators of JAG and Military Diaries stress that the Pentagon has no editorial control over any them, the military have come to view such shows not as harmless fun, but as “militainment;”[xxix] an effective way to get its message across, free of the filters of a critical press corps. The filmmakers are clearly very touchy over suggestions that they are pawns of the military. “We're storytellers. We work with people who have stories to tell. But we're not propagandists for the military, and we never said we were. Our goal is to ask a lot of questions and find out what the experience is like.”[xxx]

“The industry decides what it will do and when it will do it,”[xxxi] Rove told reporters, who singularly failed to note that the administration need not impose its views in the face of utter acquiescence: Hollywood had hardly been a hot bed of rebellion. A more conservative period was underway long before the descent of the twin towers; from Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan, Air Force One, Independence Day, to the television shows “Band of Brothers” and “The West Wing,” Hollywood is projecting a constant stream of images that portray a benign power and an American goodness.[xxxii]

At the dawn of the Third Millennium, the United States finds herself in an unparalleled position: her strengths are unquestioned, her economy and military power dominate the globe. As the sole remaining superpower, the US should have more opportunity now than ever before to shape the world to its long-standing interests: peace and prosperity, stability and security, defense and democracy. However, this ignores the decline in the US resource base relative to other nations. Compared with competitors, the US economic performance no longer allows it to exercise political leverage at will. America, whilst still a giant, has become like Gulliver, increasingly tied to others by strings of trade deals, treaties and other such obligations. The US can neither act alone in an interdependent world nor expect to regain the power it possessed after World War Two when it was not just stronger than anyone, but stronger than everyone.

America’s strengths have come to induce anger in many, weakening America’s global position, as much of the world has shown an unwillingness to accede to American leadership. Whilst it seems clear that America is presently the world’s sole super- power, it is likely that it will not remain so indefinitely. Many of America’s Cold War allies are already differing from the US in their assessment of global priorities and how to respond to the challenges of the post Cold War era. This is highlighted in Europe and America’s inability to deal with tribal conflict and rising Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, economic competition is rising at the same time the US’s ability to manage the world economy is diminishing. Faced with this situation, the US may have to view the world through more realistic eyes.

As the world enters the third millennium it seems likely that the present uni-polar moment will equally pass into history. Evidence points to the emergence of a new multipolar system within which America will be first among equals but will face challenges to its leadership in the world economy and maybe even military challenges. The Pentagon’s objective of preventing the emergence of a rival super- power, as outlined in the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance has had to be abandoned as being unrealistic. Clearly with its huge population and landmass, the Republic of China is a super-power whether it wishes to be or not. It must be asked as to whether conventional assumptions remain warranted at the turn of the millennium. What is needed is imaginative thinking about America’s role in the world, not a projection of present policy into the future. America’s place in the world has been brought sharply into focus by the events of September 11, what Bill Clinton has referred to as “the dark side of Globalism.”[xxxiii] Most of the assumptions made over the past 50 years have served America well, now new ideas are needed for a new time.

In his book Thirteen Days, Robert Kennedy wrote, “If America is to be successful, we will need friends and supporters, we will need respect.”[xxxiv] To many, this is a sentiment sadly lacking in current American thinking. However, the capture of Saddam Hussein and the decision of Muammar Gadaffi to surrender Libya’s nuclear program have enhanced America’s place in the world. These moves appear to lend credence to President Bush’s decision to wage a pre-emptive war in Iraq, in the hopes of producing a domino effect in reverse, of peace breaking out in the Middle East. Whilst such a development is still some way off, the moves of the past months offer the first possible hints that America’s new place in the world may not be as negative as many had been forecasting twelve months ago. For the time being therefore, it appears that America’s place in the world is assured. The nation based so heavily on the revolutionary ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness will continue to lead the world it did so much to shape.