The Emergence of the Clinton Presidency

When Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton announced his candidacy for the Presidency of the United States it appeared unlikely that he would be the man to steer America through the rapidly changing world of the 1990s. The idea that a 46 year old governor, from the second poorest state in the union, could unseat a president with the highest approval ratings ever recorded seemed unrealistic and most assumed he was preparing for a more viable run in 1996 against Vice President Dan Quayle.[i] 

However, if the Bush Administration offered a limited vision for the role of government in a time of low public expectations, Governor Clinton was prepared to offer an alternative to the American people. As a leading member of the Progressive Policy Institute, Clinton was a proponent of The Third Way, a theory of leadership that purported a middle ground between the concepts of liberalism and conservatism. No longer was the choice one of two extremes, now there was the possibility of a new direction that would combine aspects from both ends of the political spectrum and provide the opportunity for a new political movement. The Third Way was a theory in need of a political leader. Governor Clinton was a leader in need of a manifesto. They found each other in time for the 1992 Presidential Election.

The Clinton campaign was aware of the challenges that would face the victor of the November election and sought to portray their candidate as a leader in waiting, advocating his eleven years as Governor of Arkansas as an example of modern leadership. He campaigned as a New Democrat to distinguish himself from the perception of past Democratic failures, with memories of John F. Kennedy being invoked on every occasion, whilst memories of Jimmy Carter were expunged.

Whilst the campaign concentrated on domestic affairs, it was mindful that foreign policy needed to be addressed in order to pass the ‘Commander-in-Chief test.’[ii] In 1992, however the American people were not interested in another crusade; The Cold War had been fought and the Gulf War had quickly followed, so by 1992 many felt that what was needed was a period of reflection whilst America tended to domestic issues. Clinton’s challenge was to bridge these diametrically opposed opinions.   

The Clinton campaign recognised that America would need to continue to be engaged in world affairs in the 1990s and rejected all calls to embrace isolationist policies. Indeed, Governor Clinton was alone in addressing foreign policy so early in the campaign. Anthony Lake had discovered in the autumn of 1991 that of the Democratic candidates, “all of them except Clinton were saying, “We can’t talk about foreign policy because it’s unpopular.””[iii] Governor Clinton understood that he was not going to win the election on matters of foreign and so sought to turn the incumbent’s perceived strength into a weaknesses, labelling George Bush, “the foreign policy president,”[iv] and promising to “focus like a laser beam on the economy.”[v] The overall election strategy was to campaign to the right of Bush on foreign affairs in an attempt to “blunt Bush’s advantage on it, and in boxing terms, keep a left jab in his face,”[vi] and to campaign to his left on domestic matters. Above all however, the Clinton campaign strove to offer a more activist approach to government.

Whilst Clinton did not dwell on foreign affairs, his past dealings with the military and his domestic priorities meant that he needed to protect himself in this area. Clinton had not served in Vietnam and a letter written following his successful avoidance of the draft revealed a shrewd and tactical individual, but gave the appearance of being a little too slick.[vii] In addition, Democratic candidates had a history of appearing weak in the area of foreign policy in contrast to their Republican opponents. By 1992 few had forgotten Michael Dukakis’ tank ride in the previous presidential election that was believed to have helped convince voters that he was not up to the job. Foreign policy failures had also contributed to the downfall of the previous Democrat president Jimmy Carter, so Clinton went out of his way to avoid damaging images that would impair his campaign: there would be no riding in tanks or falling out of airplanes.[viii] As a Democrat, Clinton had a foreign policy credibility gap to bridge, long before he began to espouse new policies of his own. 

The Clinton campaign strategy was straightforward: They would concentrate on domestic affairs whenever possible and mention foreign policy only when necessary and always in a manner designed to demonstrate their candidate’s abilities. Addressing foreign policy early in the campaign, two months before the first primary, allowed Clinton to stake his position on foreign policy and gain the support of the Democratic foreign policy elite, before returning to domestic issues on the hustings. 

Clinton spoke of the challenges of building “a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets and growth at a time of great change.”[ix] Clinton suggested a multilateral approach would be favoured under any future administration, coupled with a political/economic approach to foreign policy.  The Clinton strategy would seek to create a strong democratic base at home, from which to project American power, both hard and soft, around the globe. The linkage concept was Clinton’s major contribution to strategic thinking. It would be returned to whenever foreign policy arose on the campaign and was an example of Clinton blending the issues to suit his own strengths. Stressing the domestic element to foreign policy allowed Governor Clinton to highlight his own record in Arkansas and to distinguish himself from President Bush. This astute manipulation of both politics and policy allowed Governor Clinton to take the battle to President Bush on the incumbent’s apparent strongest area. 

Many have questioned the underlying principles behind a Clinton foreign policy, however it is clear that the core policies were present from the very beginning and were outlined succinctly by the candidate. “We must restructure our military forces for a new era…work with our allies to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroad…and re-establish America’s economic leadership at home and in the world.”[x] These three core values would become the blueprint for the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy and would be the bedrock of all future campaign addresses on the subject. At the forefront of this policy was the notion of democratic promotion, which carried the dual caveat of making the world safer, whilst also opening new markets for U.S. exports, resulting in more American jobs.

Clinton was able to expand upon his notion of democratic promotion by calling for Ukrainian independence, advocating a far more dynamic agenda that sat in stark contrast to the “Chicken Kiev”[xi] policy of the Bush Administration. Accusing the President of moral cowardice, Clinton decried George Bush for withholding  “moral support,” and for “publicly chid(ing) Ukraine’s voices of independence for seeking a ‘suicidal nationalism.’”[xii] Clinton was again able to fuse the ideas inherent in both New Internationalism and Retrenched Internationalism thinking, to form a new and distinct policy. Clinton portrayed himself as an agent of change, in stark contrast to Bush who had “sided with the status quo rather than democratic change.

With his eyes on the White House, Clinton echoed Kennedy’s call for a new generation of leadership that would be “strategic, vigorous and grounded in America’s democratic values…a world…increasingly engaged in democracy, tolerant of diversity and respectful of human rights.”[xiii] This exemplified the changes that had enveloped the campaign as it sought to utilise soaring rhetoric to define its aspirations for the future. The language of the past would be utilised to portray a vision of the future that would be interventionist and internationalist.

Whilst Clinton attacked Bush for his “callous disregard for democratic principles,”[xiv] after the Gulf War, he was careful to avoid calling for a democratic cru­sade: “Every ideal, including the promotion of democracy, must be tempered with prudence and common sense. We cannot support every group’s hopes for self-determination.”[xv] This was an indication of how much had changed since President Kennedy promised to “pay any price, bear any burden,”[xvi] to support liberty. It was also an acknowledgment that America could not guarantee the rights of pro-democracy groups the world over. Democracy would be promoted where possible, but pragmatism would prevail as democratic promotion became not an overriding moral duty, “but one objective amongst others that would help guarantee America’s place in a complex international system.”[xvii]

As the campaign continued, the more presidential Clinton sought to appear.  However the policy of appearing more activist than President Bush led to statements that would return to haunt him as he called for intervention in Somalia, a reversal of Bush’s repatriation policy towards Haitian refuges and for US intervention in the Balkans. As Election Day grew near, the Clinton campaign sought to demonstrate that its proposals were influencing White House policy as it suggested that Bush now agreed with the Democrats on a Balkan strategy: Such an activist stance would later come back to haunt the Clinton Administration, as it recognised the difficulties involved in their implementation.

Despite the wild lead in the polls that Clinton had enjoyed during the campaign,[xviii] the figures tightened considerably in the final days of the election and the Clinton team felt that with Bush stressing the threats and dangers of the new world, an international incident could be enough to convince voters to re-elect the incumbent. However, despite potential troop deployments in Somalia, Bosnia or Iraq, no such moves materialised by Election Day, paving the way for the election of Bill Clinton as the forty second President of the United Sates.

The campaign had raised expectations of a pro-active, pro-democracy administration that would attempt to rectify what it saw as the inadequacies of the Reagan/Bush years and to establish a new neo-Wilsonian commitment to multinational initiatives. Having spent twelve months defining himself through his public statements, Clinton would now be judged by his actions, and defined by the inaction of others as problems arose less over the defining of policy, than in its execution and application. Over the ensuing eleven weeks the President-elect would be forced to confront the viability of promises and assumptions he had made during the campaign and even before he set foot in the Oval Office as president, he would discover that his attempts to dwell on domestic policy would be thwarted by events over which he had little or no control.

Despite the mantra of essential continuity, changes became apparent immediately. On the morning after the election, world leaders attempting to offer Clinton their congratulations were told, “The next President of the United States is not available, call back tomorrow.”[xix] This was a calculated decision to declare immediately to the American people and to world leaders that this president would not afford foreign affairs the same priority that George Bush had. It was not a move however that did anything to improve his international standing among those leaders with which he would need to work in the coming years.

Clinton was adamant that foreign policy should not disturb him during the transition and on his first full day as President-elect, urged “America’s friends and foes alike to recognise that America has only one president at a time…that even as America’s administrations change, America’s fundamental interests do not.”[xx] Besides stating the obvious, that Bush remained President, the declaration also distanced the President-elect from any foreign policy decision-making during the transition. Yet many of the essential elements of Bush’s foreign policy would continue under Clinton: the Middle East peace talks; negotiations on the details of the START II arms control agreement; world trade talks; bolstering Russia’s fledgling democracy; efforts to find a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the republics of the former Yugoslavia; and assisting the victims of famine in Somalia. All were generic issues that varied little, if at all from what George H. W. Bush would have continued had he been re-elected.  Since the President-elect did not wish to dwell on the issue and as his administration would not be foreign policy focused, it made sense to continue existing programs, at least initially. If nothing else, it saved time devising new ones.

Despite plaudits for the campaign, the Clinton transition period did not begin well. Whilst Clinton’s admirable quest for a Cabinet that would “look like America,” resulted in team where white males were in a minority, “his obsessive demands for balance and the way he agonised over choices prolonged the process so much that few other jobs were properly filled.”[xxi] Historically, it is often the case that the seeds of defeat are planted at the moment of victory. “Mistakes in the first weeks by the transition team can fatally affect public perception of a presidency and set a course that is difficult to change.”[xxii] The omens for the Clinton team, beset by divisions and tension, did not bode well.

During the campaign Clinton strenuously resisted any comparison with the Carter presidency and as President-elect, he was under pressure to avoid appointing Cabinet Secretaries that could be considered “Carter Administration retreads.”[xxiii] However the President-elect faced a great challenge in appointing his foreign policy staff due to the time that the Democratic Party had spent out of office. In 1992 the party had been out of power for twelve years, and in power for only four of the past twenty-four years. The Democrats may have had the necessary enthusiasm, but were sadly lacking in governmental experience.

There were also the traits of the president to consider, for there was “always the sense that Bill and Hillary thought they could do it all themselves.” Both were used to being the centre of attention, something they were determined to continue at the White House. “As a result, some of the most clever and experienced Democratic Party operatives found themselves shut out of the administration or marginalized…like Richard Holbrooke, arguable the most skilful diplomat in the party.[xxiv]

Historically there is no more important position in the Cabinet than the Secretary of State. However, an activist, assertive Secretary of State who would undertake new and potentially unpredictable initiatives was not what the President–elect wanted. Other Presidents, with a larger majority or with greater personal standing with the military could have named a Republican to head either the State or Defence departments, as President Kennedy did in 1960 and as Clinton would do in 1996. In 1992 however, this was not an option for Clinton, despite overtures to Colin Powell.[xxv]

In light of these circumstances, it appeared likely that the successful candidates would be found in the Congress. However there was a reluctance to take people out of the Senate, for fear of narrowing Clinton’s slender majority. Also the most viable candidates in the Senate had enjoyed a national reputation long before Clinton and “tended to look down on him as an upstart.”[xxvi] With Clinton’s questionable mandate, many felt that real power would lie in Congress for the next four years. With the Cold War over, few believed an era of presidential assertiveness in the area of foreign policy was likely. 

The only man who fitted Clinton’s criteria and who was prepared to serve was already part of the transition team. Warren Christopher was what Clinton needed; a “thoroughly professional individual with lots of connections who knew the terrain and had complete control of his ego.”[xxvii] However not everyone thought he was up to the job. “Dean Rusk without the charisma,”[xxviii] was the damning phrase used by those not impressed with his selection. Critics complained that Christopher, no geopolitical strategist was “unlikely to develop into a Metternich for the 1990s.”[xxix]

There were other foreign policy officials to consider, specifically at the National Security Council. Michael Mandelbaum, who had advised the campaign on Russian affairs, coveted the role of National Security Adviser and could claim a relationship with the President-elect going back to their university days. He would be disappointed however, as the President-elect turned instead to Anthony Lake. Ultimately, Lake’s foreign policy outlook more readily paralleled the President-elect’s, thinking as he did in humanitarian and moral terms rather than an old fashioned strategic geopolitical ones.

The top job at the Pentagon remained a dilemma and would be a contentious post considering Clinton’s record with the military. Senator Sam Nunn was considered, but his conservative voting record made him anathema to many in the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. There also remained a reluctance to take people out of Congress, but Les Aspin, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was a natural choice, given his intellect and campaign assistance. The only question mark arose as to whether Aspin was too abrasive to be Secretary of Defence and whether the military would accept him.[xxx] In the end it was decided to appoint Aspin, although his time in office would not be a happy one.

Clinton had sought a Cabinet that would “look like America,”[xxxi] but the defining aspects of his foreign policy team was their membership of the Council on Foreign Relations and their previous experience under Jimmy Carter. Dee Dee Myers expressed the views of many when she pondered the great unanswerable question; “What do we say when someone suggests that this is a bunch of Carter Administration retreads?”[xxxii] The essential continuity so sought by Clinton appeared to some to be with the 1970’s not with the early 1990s.

Despite his domestic agenda, Clinton did have foreign policy priorities; an emboldened UN with a military capacity and a humanitarian mission, economic support for Russian democracy and a willingness to get tough with tyrants. These notions were largely ethereal however, and Clinton had to deal with the world he inherited in the winter of 1992. President-elect Clinton may have wished to effect change, but in the area of foreign policy, he would find himself a prisoner of his own past and of past decisions made long before he ran for the presidency. On issue after issue, he would find himself restricted by his past, the size of his mandate, political intransigence and the realities of governing in the 1990s.

The end of the Cold War brought many benefits to America, but the possibility that a president could disengage from global politics was not one of them. Yet the campaign had done little to prepare the incoming administration for the realities of dealing with the outside world, as the efforts of all three candidates had ensured the election would focus on the state of the American economy, rather than its global role in the new era. The problem with concentrating on domestic American politics to the exclusion of the world was that “if you are the President of United States, you do not find trouble, trouble finds you.”[xxxiii] Clinton would quickly discover that despite his wish to take bold strides, the art of diplomacy demanded small steps. Change would be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

There was no disputing that economic policy would be the priority. “I just went through the whole campaign and no one talked about foreign policy at all, except for a few members of the press,”[xxxiv] Clinton told Lee Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This remark betrayed the President-Elect’s sentiments towards foreign policy, for he was not a man without interests in the area. He had studied at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, had won a Rhode’s Scholarship to Oxford, had travelled extensively and knew that foreign relations would be essential to his plan to grow the American economy, through the opening of foreign markets.

However foreign Policy was not of interest to Clinton for its own sake, but in terms of how it could assist his plans to reinvigorate the American economy. This philosophy was a reflection not only of the candidate but also of his times. No previous President could have elevated economics to the level of national security due to Cold War struggle. Clinton, freed from this commitment, was finally able to do so.

Clinton believed that American foreign policy should be constructed around a coherent approach to international co-operation and the use of international institutions, such as the United Nations. This approach defined the United States not so much as a Hyper-power but rather as a nation with international duties: Where democracy existed or might exist, Washington should accept the task that flowed from victory in the Cold War, of making sure that democrats were defended against dictators. During the transition however it was unclear how this philosophy would be implemented, as its proponents argued for everything from sanction imposition to military intervention. It was clear however that with events unfolding in the world, Clinton’s philosophy would not remain theoretical for long.

Following a campaign acknowledged by Clinton’s adversaries as being efficient and organised, the transition period proved to be anything but. “Clinton’s transition from candidate to President is considered by many historians, and by more than a few staff members who suffered through it, as the worst in modern history.”[xxxvi] The crucial first impressions were not inspiring, indeed to many, the worst fears were realised, as the team that gathered around the President-elect was drawn from the funeral pyre of the Carter Presidency. Clinton’s declaration of essential continuity was shaping up to be defined as a continuity with 1979, as he appeared to break with his previous determination to strenuously resist comparisons with the Carter years. Inexperience and in some cases sheer exhaustion meant that many in the administration simply “hit the ground barely standing.”[xxxvii] Clinton’s political honeymoon was short and not sweet and was effectively over before he entered the Oval Office.