The Clinton Doctrine

If ever an administration appeared to have the opportunity to come into office with a clean slate, it was the Clinton Administration. With the end of the Cold War, it was felt that an opportunity existed to construct new policies for a new age, particularly in the area of foreign policy. Likewise, with the end of the perilous arms race, it was believed that a peace dividend could now be paid to the American people, as the US government considered long over-looked domestic issues: The 1990s promised to be a time for an American re-birth.

However all was not as it appeared. Far from having a free hand to redesign foreign policy, the Clinton Administration found itself locked into agreements, deployments and obligations that had been initiated long before it came to power. Spending plans and defence contracts were still being initiated from policies developed in the 1980s. Troops were deployed around the globe in commitments reaching back to the outbreak of the Cold War and a new operation had recently been launched in Somalia that would soon come to haunt the new administration. Clinton’s efforts overseas, as well as his campaign promises of an improved American infrastructure, were both placed in jeopardy by the enormity of the federal budget deficit. Upon taking office the President was faced by a stark choice: get serious about deficit reduction or face interest rate hikes that would prolong the recession that had proven the undoing of President George H. W. Bush. This was no idle threat; the warning came from Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. The decision to begin chiselling away at the mountain of debt would impact both the President’s foreign and domestic agendas, since the administration faced a cap on the federal budget. This instantly reduced the options for domestic spending, but also restricted funding for foreign operations. As Al Gore’s National Security Adviser Leon Fuerth put it recently, “whenever troops were used the Pentagon would provide us with a cost estimate and we were faced with the prospect of going to Congress and asking for extra funds. The problem with this was that if we did this, it would break the budget cap and end the President’s efforts to reduce the deficit, help the bond and stock market and improve the US domestic economy.”[1]

Therefore the Clinton Administration’s options were far from being wide open. They were however susceptible to the impulses of the foreign policy team, particularly those of his National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. As perhaps the most intellectual member of Clinton’s foreign policy team,[2] National Security Adviser Anthony Lake promoted the notion of neo-Wilsonianism. This was a Third Way in foreign policy, which Lake saw as a quest to create a stable world that was neither naively liberal in the Wilsonian sense nor relentlessly realist in the conservative sense. This nuanced approach would distinguish the Clinton Administration from the realpolitik of the Bush years as Clinton and Lake presented the possibility of a worldview that was a reversion to the past: not the extension of the US military power against an evil empire, but a belief that America had international duties. Where democracy existed or might exist, Washington should accept the task that flowed from victory in the Cold War: ensuring democracies were defended against dictators.

If Tony Lake provided the intellect, Warren Christopher was expected to add the gravitas. Clinton had wanted a competent Secretary of State, but few were excited by Christopher or his view of the world. “Dean Rusk without the charisma,” [3] was the damning phrase used by those not impressed with Christopher’s selection. Critics observed that Christopher, no geopolitical strategist, was “unlikely to develop into a Metternich for the 1990s.”[4] During his Senate confirmation hearings, Christopher had declared, “I will not attempt to fit the foreign policy of the next four years into the straitjacket of some neatly tailored doctrine.”[5] Whilst this initially appeared to be indicative of a new pragmatic approach to foreign policy, it rapidly became viewed as a flawed concept as the administration was seen to stumble from one crisis to the next, with little or no sense of strategic direction.

However the basis of Bill Clinton’s approach to foreign policy remained consistent from the time he announced his intention to seek the Democratic nomination in October 1991. At the time many Democrats endorsed the notion of New Internationalism, which advocated an American promotion of democracy with a concentration on multi­lateralism. This activist approach was based on American values but with other nations sharing the financial burden. There were other Democrats however, who believed that the times called for a policy of Retrenched Internationalism; that the end of the Cold War allowed America to focus on outstanding domestic social problems. Whilst not advocating a return to isolationism, they believed that economic issues should be considered alongside defence and diplomatic matters.[6] Clinton’s challenge was to find a way to bridge these diametrically opposed outlooks. Through astute public speaking and a shrewd use of both language and locations, Clinton combined elements of New Internationalism and Retrenched Internationalism into one discernable policy. Clinton’s statements on foreign policy would advocate a distinct American engagement in the world, but in such a way as to stress both the idealism and the practical implications of such a policy. Clinton would concentrate on economic policy in his mainstream addresses, with foreign policy reserved for select audiences. 

“The strategy of American engagement I propose…must pursue three clear objectives,” the candidate declared at Georgetown University in December 1991. “First, we must restructure our military forces for a new era.  Second, we must work with our allies to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroad.  And third, we must re-establish America's economic leadership at home and in the world.”[7] This statement would become the blueprint for Clinton’s foreign policy and would be the bedrock of all future campaign addresses on the subject. At the forefront of this policy was Lake’s notion of democratic promotion. This carried the duel caveat of making the world safer, whilst also opening new markets for U.S. exports, resulting in more American jobs. The policy combined Lake’s moral call to enlarge democracy with Clinton’s advocacy of economic growth. In this one policy, Clinton delivered upon his attempts to “tear down the wall in our thinking between domestic and foreign policy.”[8] Clinton successfully combined the elements of New Internationalism and Retrenched Internationalism into a single concept, which permeated policy, influenced rhetoric and helped define attitudes in the White House and beyond. “What Clinton liked best about Lake’s enlargement policy was the way it was linked to economic renewal with its emphasis on making sure US remained the number one exporter.” [9]

With the overall concepts already in place, perhaps the greatest dilemma arose over what to name the policy. As a replacement for Containment the administration sought to define its philosophy in a way that would capture the public imagination and establish a base upon which to build future policy. It was believed that a successful doctrine was needed to capture the public imagination and “convince voters that the administration had a master plan and was not merely reacting to world events, but was indeed, shaping them.”[10] In an effort to do so, the administration engaged in what Douglas Brinkley has referred to as ‘The Kennan Sweepstakes.’ In August 1993, President Clinton ordered his foreign policy advisers to encapsulate their foreign and defence policies into a phrase or notion that would capture the public’s attention and provide a rallying call for politicians in Washington. However, “with no Cold War…it’s tough to put US policy goals on a bumper sticker.”[11]

Within days, members of the National Security Council and the State Department were contributing ideas and concepts. From State came the suggestion of ‘Engagement,’ from Madeleine Albright, the concept of ‘Assertive Multilateralism:’ It appeared that everyone had their own concept of have best to define US foreign policy in the 1990s. Finally, ‘Democratic Enlargement’ emerged as a phrase that Tony Lake believed encapsulated Clinton’s strategy. The President concurred and ‘Enlargement’ became the policy of the hour.

The administration attempted to roll out this new concept through a series of speeches in September 1993. The clearest explanation of Clinton’s policy however came not from the President but from his National Security Adviser in a speech entitled “From Containment to Enlargement.” It was the clearest, most succinct foreign policy statement to come out of the Clinton White House and it set forth the administration’s view of the world and how it intended to help shape it. Before announcing the new policy, Lake was eager to reject two of the fashionable concepts in foreign policy circles, declaring that the world had arrived at “neither the end of history nor a clash of civilizations but a moment of immense democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity.”[12] Now was the time to combine the two opportunities in one unifying policy that took account of the new world environment. Lake was adamant, “The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”[13] The policy would promote democracy, isolate Iran and Iraq and work with the UN to implement a process of Enlargement, which would “combine our broad goals of fostering democracy and markets with our more traditional geopolitical interests.”[14]

The United Nations was central to the new policy and was an organisation that would remain contentious for the duration of Clinton’s presidency, with many believing this multilateral approach was ceding too much power to the UN. Lake believed however that the argument between unilateralists and multilateralists was misplaced. Since both agreed that America had important interests abroad, surely the US defence should be based on a pragmatic use of both unilateral and multilateral approaches. “We should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests, and we should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose.  The simple question in each instance is:  What works best?”[15] Lake went to lengths to clarify that practical interests, not starry-eyed idealism, would guide the administration. “This is not a democratic crusade; it is a pragmatic commitment to see freedom take hold where that will help us most.”[16] This would be a targeted policy, open to interpretation by the administration. Therefore, although the enlargement policy was presented as a challenge to the growing mood of neo-isolationism, and a determination to maintain US global leadership, Lake was clear that the US was going to be selective and cautious in its interventions. “While there will be increasing calls on us to help stem bloodshed and suffering in ethnic conflicts…there will be relatively few intra-national ethnic conflicts that justify our military intervention.  Ultimately, on these and other humanitarian needs, we will have to pick and choose.”[17] It would be a statement that would come to have important implications for the future implementation of policy in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Kosovo.

The strategy of Enlargement rejected the more expansive view that America was duty bound to promote constitutional democracy and human rights everywhere. Rather, Enlargement would be aimed at US strategic and economic interests. “We cannot impose democracy on regimes that appear to be opting for liberalisation, but we may be able to help steer some of them down that path while providing penalties that raise the costs of repression and aggressive behaviour.”[18] Asia, for instance had a very different view of what constituted democracy, since it emphasised social order over individual rights. Nowhere was this more the case than in China. “Under Enlargement, America’s chief concern in Beijing would therefore be free market access, the rest, for the most part, will be left to sort itself out.”[19]

As a concept, “Democratic Enlargement” had many advantages. It was conceptually simple; it highlighted the fact that the end of the Cold War presented great potential to expand political freedom and, “unlike all the self-proclaimed competitors like “clash of civilizations,” it had a positive rather than a negative sound to it.”[20] It was an important message that many felt was over due, but consider the facts: The administration had been in office only eight months, it was the first new administration following the end of a forty five year period, during which, successive administrations had been able to rely on an elementary policy of Containment, and it was an administration with a mandate to concentrate on sweeping domestic reform, not foreign policy. The administration however, was prepared to admit that they could have been more organised with regard to this. “As far as providing a road map for the public and Congress and allies and others, we have not done well,”[21] a White House official said.

As mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the Clinton Administration had to turn Lake’s policy of Democratic Enlargement into a fully-fledged National Security Strategy. Throughout the autumn of 1993 and into 1994, the staff at the NSC’s Defence Directorate sought to distil the input from the Pentagon, the State Department and the National Security Council into a document that would satisfy the various departments. Unhappy with the result, Tony Lake eventually turned the document over to Morton Halperin who had recently transferred to the NSC from the Pentagon. Two drafts later the document was finally released in July 1994 and was an amalgamation of various speeches, policy papers and ideas that had been formulated during the 1992 campaign and during Clinton’s first year in office. Its central themes were of linkage, a refusal to adopt isolationist policies and the continuation of Clinton’s claims that a weak economy un­dermined American diplomacy.

The document declared the protection of America’s security to be the administration’s “foremost mission and constitutional duty.”[22] Few could fault this statement of fact, but issue would be found with its implementation. Also open to speculation was the administration’s dedication to this statement, considering the implications it carried for a domestic recovery. Would the President place foreign security interests ahead of domestic renewal? Clinton was able to avoid answering such tough questions by declaring that for “America to be strong abroad it must be strong economically at home.”[23] Drawing upon a position that the President had taken in the 1994 State of the Union Address, the NSSR declared that security, economics, and the belief in democracy were “mutually supportive.”[24] The report declared that such a tripartite policy was advocated on the principle that “Democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with us to meet security threats and promote sustainable development. Secure nations are more likely to maintain democratic structures and to support free trade.” [25]

National Security however, must ultimately consider the use of force and here the document was revealing. It is important to recall that the document was drafted in light of the incidents that had occurred during 1993, and they made an impact, especially in the area of multilateralism. The document attempted to walk a fine line between defending the administration’s inclination towards multilateralism, which it referred to as “an important component of our strategy,”[26] and the fact that events in Somalia had predicated a need to espouse a more robust unilateral approach to foreign policy. The document stove to set out the basis for future US multilateral action and in so doing, attempt to demonstrate that the administration had learnt from the lessons of Somalia. Clearly, the administration was determined to avoid being drawn into long-term peacekeeping operations again. However one of the report’s primary assertions was that  “No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot secure these basic goals unilaterally.”[27] Again, this concept of seeking multilateral solutions was drawn from the speeches made during the campaign and from the President’s first year in office. The report was adamant that in the last decade of the Twentieth Century, “Whether the problem is nuclear proliferation, regional instability, the reversal of reform in the former Soviet empire, or unfair trade practices, the threats and challenges we face demand cooperative, multinational solutions.” [28] There was clearly a schism between the administration’s multilateral aspirations and the growing demands for greater emphasis on unilateral action from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

With the UN coming under increasing criticism the Clinton Administration provided a straightforward solution: “The only responsible US strategy is one that seeks to ensure US influence over and participation in collective decision making in a wide and growing range of circumstances.”[29] Simply put, there were more international bodies than just the UN and it would not be enough for the US to simply participate in such organisations; America must exert influence over them, and the list of such organisations would grow rapidly under Clinton. Initially, the United Nations was the organisation of choice, but it would soon become clear that Clinton had aspirations far beyond the UN. Indeed, one of Clinton’s successes was in placing America at the heart of international organisations and institutions, enabling it to lead and mould the aforementioned bodies according to its own design. Clinton would ensure that the United States utilised a plethora of multilateral bodies not only for foreign and military means, but for economic pol­icy also. Global organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organiza­tion (WTO), would all be utilised to aid American recovery and ensure her continued dominance, through a process of Globalisation.

In addition to the theoretical projection of power, the document dealt with specific world regions, highlighting achievements in the Middle East and the challenges that faced the administration in Russia where, “the success of these democratic reforms makes us all more secure; they are the best answers to the aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds unleashed by the end of the Cold War.” [30] The administration had clear grounds for concern over the former Soviet Union and much of the philosophy that went into Engagement and Enlargement was incorporated with the former enemy in mind. As Leon Fuerth has stated, “We viewed it as a Ratchet Principal, a guard against the situation slipping back to the previous situation, particularly in the former Soviet Union.”[31]

Europe would see the most tangible example of Enlargement, when NATO expanded during Clinton’s second term, a goal highlighted in the 1994 report. “The aim of NATO’s future expansion will not be to draw a new line in Europe further east, but to expand stability, democracy, pros­perity and security.”[32] The importance of East Asia was prominent, for “nowhere are the strands of our three-pronged strategy more inter­twined, nor is the need for continued US engagement more evident. Now more than ever, security, open markets and democracy go hand in hand in our approach to this dynamic region.”[33] Of specific relevance was the decision to separate China’s Most Favoured Nation status from its record on human rights, which best reflects the financial motivations behind the policy. In this decision, it is clear to see that Clinton had moved from his initial idealism to a more pragmatic approach to world affairs. Whereas President Woodrow Wilson would make the world safe for Democracy, Clinton would make the world safe for commerce.

Other Presidents had advanced the importance of economic policy, but as US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor noted, Clinton was the first to “really make the bridge between foreign trade and domestic policy.”[34]  The 1994 NSSR document set out the financial realities of Democratic Enlargement, as it became evident that in addition to its Wilsonian principles of spreading democracy, there were serious financial benefits to the policy. “The best way to advance America's interests worldwide is to enlarge the community of democracies and free markets throughout the world.”[35] Above all, it is clear that the notion of linkage remained central to Clinton’s approach to the wider world. Clinton’s contribution to strategic thinking was to formally link national economic security with American national security in a pragmatic policy for an evolving international environment.

Engagement and Enlargement indicated that the Administration had a strategic vision of America’s place in the world. Its supporters defined it as a pragmatic policy for an evolving international environment that advanced the belief that democracies were unlikely to threaten American interests and would support free trade. It was believed that international peace and stability would be a by-product of American globalisation, as Clinton’s policy sought to ensure that America remained the world's indispensable nation by embedding America at the heart of all major international organisations and structures, such as GATT, NATO, WTO, NAFTA, G7 and APEC. Yet the policy also came in for harsh criticism. Critics suggested that Clinton had mistaken his trade policy for foreign policy. Engagement and Enlargement contained the admirable goal of aiding nations in their efforts to attain democracy, but it was suggested, it offered little by way of a strategy.

If the speeches and the NSSR document lacked specifics in terms of a broad strategy, they nevertheless conveyed the message that America would continue to be engaged in world affairs, albeit selectively. They also strove to refute allegations of weakness and of an over-dependence on multilateralism. They left no doubt that the Clinton Administration intended to continue to adopt an activist foreign policy and would remain internationalist in perspective, adopting a multilateral approach when possible, but acting unilaterally when necessary. That was not to say however, that Clinton would engage American forces recklessly. Indeed, the underlying message of the policy was that from now on, the administration would be selective about where and when it posted its resources.

Although the administration wished to be cautious in its execution of military operations, this did not mean that it would be adopting a passive foreign policy. Indeed the emphasis of the speeches was on a pro-active effort to introduce positive change to the world, and to rollback the remaining influences of the Cold War, in order to usher in a new era of democracy. The difficulty would not come in convincing policy makers of the righteousness of the concept, but in its implementation, especially if that meant the deployment of American ground troops. For all of the successes of his first year in office, Clinton’s initial tenure was over­shadowed by embarrassing incidents on the periphery of America’s sphere of interests.

In October 1993, two Black Hawk helicopters were brought down in Somalia and eighteen US servicemen were killed in the ensuing ambush. The death of U.S. servicemen in Mogadishu was tragic enough. That it was broadcast on CNN was a political dis­aster. In the days that followed, the captain of the lightly armed USS Harlan County chose not to dock in Haiti when machete wielding locals taunted the ship, promising “another Somalia.”[36] To compound matters, ethnic cleansing continued unabated in Bosnia, with many now openly asking why America was engaged in Somali but not Bosnia. To many, these three crises highlighted the intrinsic flaws in the Administration and made a mockery of the policy announcements of September 1993.

Clearly there was a void between theoretical concepts and the actual manifestation of American power around the globe. This of course was not a unique instance. One need think only of the Reagan administration and their rhetoric concerning threats to American forces, which was neatly overlooked during the race to leave Beirut. It should also cause one to consider the fact that policy documents can only ever be expected to present a broad over-view of aspirations and intentions. In the words of Leon Fuerth, “nobody reaches for these documents when situations emerge. Nobody rings up the NSC and asks, “How does the NSSR tell us to respond.”[37] They are ultimately prepared for two purposes:  “So the President can point to something and say, “Here, we have a foreign policy,” and secondly because the law requires such a document.” [38] The documents provided a philosophical framework with which foreign policy was formulated, but it is imperative to consider the events that the administration faced in its initial years in office. In the words of Morin Halperin, “Any concept that the policy influences events or people’s reaction to them is just wrong.”[39] It was events, not philosophy, that most influenced decision making in the Clinton White House.

By the time the NSSR was updated in February 1995, the Clinton Administration had gone through a steep learning curve. By delegating foreign policy to his advisers, Clinton remained true to his goal of focusing on the economy, which led to vast reductions in the US federal deficit. However this also led to allegations that Clinton was disengaged in foreign policy decision-making process, reducing the authority of America and its officials around the globe. Nancy Soderberg has stated that, “It took us 2 years to figure out the new balance of force and diplomacy in the post cold war era,”[40] a delay that tainted the administration in the eyes of many. Simultaneously, Clinton realised that due to the electoral timescales, he had a finite period to enact his domestic program and so prioritised his deficit reduction plan and attempted to introduce universal health care coverage. The international repercussions revealed that the President couldn’t abdicate interest over one area of government merely for the benefit of another.

Critics remained unimpressed by the 1995 incarnation of Engagement and Enlargement, choosing to view it as a policy with no connection to reality, as an aspiration rather than a strategy, an “uninspired, the predictable by-product of Lake, a former professor, pursuing arcane geopolitical textbooks.” [41] To many Engagement and Enlargement failed to provide a framework with which to respond to the many foreign policy challenges that erupted in the 1990s and was perhaps “a triumph of process over substance.”[42] The promotion of free markets may have given direction to US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, or to Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, but this element of Engagement and Enlargement failed to provide a specific strategy for the promotion of democracy. Leslie Gelb observed that international trade was the only area in which Clinton had demonstrated conviction, but that “a foreign economic policy is not a foreign policy and it is not a na­tional security strategy.”[43] However, those who critiqued the administration for its actions in Somali and Haiti failed to recognise that both were remnants of President Bush’s New World Order and that Clinton’s Engagement and Enlargement policy would have placed both nations on the periphery of US foreign policy interests, since neither were capable of developing the all-important market economies so sought out by the administration.

By the time the administration published the 1996 National Security Strategy Review, the White House was in election mode and the document chose to define foreign policy advancements in relation to the impact upon the lives of the American people. Following Clinton Administration initiatives, by 1996 Russian missiles were no longer targeted on America, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus had surrendered their nuclear arsenals, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty had been unconditionally extended and North Korea had halted its own nuclear program. The administration’s efforts had literally lifted the sword of Damocles from above the nation, with the ensuing benefits for the American people.

The administration claimed that the American people were safer from terrorism due to their “closer cooperation with foreign governments and sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism, while increasing the resources for our own law enforcement agencies.”[44] The American people had been spared an influx of refugees due to the efforts of the administration in dealing with the issues in Haiti: “In the month before we forced the military rulers to step down, 16,000 Haitians fled their country for our shores and elsewhere…three months after the intervention, the refugee flow was practically zero.”[45] The likelihood of American’s being forced into battle had been reduced by the administration’s efforts “to help the nations of Central Europe consolidate democracy, find lasting security and build strong economics.” [46] The US economy and therefore her people would benefit from the administration’s support for “democratic reform and the transition to free markets in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union.” [47] It was this last point that was most salient within the administration. By combining economic policy with their foreign policy, the Clinton Administration was able by 1996 to highlight how US foreign policy was improving the lives of millions of Americans: “Our strategy’s trade initiatives, from NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT to over 80 separate trade agreements, have created more than two million American jobs.”[48]

The administration had actively sought to avoid armed combat for its first years in office, believing in the worlds of Nancy Soderberg, that armed conflict “was for a World War Three Scenario.”[49] However the administration was adamant that it had been a power for good in the world and had  “stopped or prevented war and brought former adversaries together in peace because it is in our interest.”[50] By 1996 the Clinton Administration firmly believed that it had made the world a better place and that by extension, the American people were better of as a result of its actions. With the pending presidential election, the document was not content merely to spell out the successes; it also stressed the costs that would have been involved had the White House not prevailed: “Tariffs…would still cripple the world trading; the Persian Gulf region would be very different today if the rapid response of the United States and its allies had not deterred Iraq’s threatened aggression against Kuwait in 1994; the flood of Haitian refugees at our borders would have continued had we not intervened; Latin America would have seen financial and economic chaos…had we not moved to help stabilize Mexico’s economy; and the dangers to our people from weapons of mass destruction would be much greater had our strategy not reduced the threat.”[51]

The NSSR was determined to demonstrate that the events of the past four years had not been predetermined but rather they had been defined by the administration, often in the face of open hostility and criticism. By 1996 the world was not yet safe, but it was safer, the report believed, because of the policies put in place by the Clinton team. The 1996 NSSR concluded that the policy of engagement and enlargement had “reaped significant accomplishments for the betterment of the American people.” It acknowledged the limit to American power, that the nation could not “become involved in every problem,” but that “America cannot walk away from its global interests or responsibilities, or our citizens’ security and prosperity will surely suffer.”[52] The National Security Strategy of the United States committed the nation to a full and vital role in world affairs, unperturbed by calls for a more isolationist approach to foreign policy. “If we can help lead the dozens of nations, the billions of producers and consumers who are trying to adapt to democracy and free markets, we help to create the conditions for the greatest expansion of prosperity and security the world has ever witnessed.”[53] For a brief time, between the end of Clinton’s second term in office and September 10, 2001, with the nation at peace and with the longest economic boom in American history, it was hard to argue with such a forecast.

Despite the election year hyperbole, there is no escaping the fact that the 1996 National Security Strategy Review would be the last to refer to Engagement and Enlargement. With the second Clinton administration would come a new NSSR policy. However, whilst the title would change, the vast majority of the policy and concepts would remain. What changed was the attempt to define the administration’s policy within a narrowly defined doctrine. From 1997 the annual NSSR would carry differing subtitles, changing from year to year. Despite their successes, the Clinton Administration would be unable to define the era through which they governed, and remained exposed to criticism that it had not defined US foreign policy, a fact highlighted by a young Provost from Stanford University: “American foreign policy cannot be all things to all people -- or rather, to all interest groups.”[54] 

Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, “Foreign policy is always a work in progress,”[55] this was never more accurate than under President Clinton, who inherited a dangerous international situation with massive nuclear proliferation in the former Soviet republics, tensions in the Middle East and massive deficits at home. Eighteen months later the Soviet proliferation issue was largely rectified and a replacement for Containment had been espoused.

However the term Engagement and Enlargement singularly failed in its efforts to engage either the public or foreign policy experts. Eventually the White House realised that in the age through which they were passing, in which America lacked both a defined enemy and a defined role, it was no longer advisable to develop narrow concepts and attempt to manipulate US foreign policy accordingly. This of course had been the view of Warren Christopher all along and his position found some supporters. John Lewis Gaddis called it “a defensible position,” adding that, “there is something to be said for staying flexible, for assessing situations as they arise, for keeping options open. One of the distinct advantages of a world without clear and present dangers is that it allows such improvisation.”[56] Gaddis was far from embracing the administration however and his ultimate sentiments appear to have been echoed by Condoleezza Rice: “If priorities and intent are not clear, they cannot be criticized. But there is a high price to pay for this approach…the absence of an articulated ‘national interest’ either produces a fertile ground for those wishing to withdraw from the world or creates a vacuum to be filled by parochial groups and transitory pressures.” [57]

Clearly the NSSR had not been hijacked by isolationist tendencies, quite the opposite in fact, but had it become prey to what Rice referred to as parochial groups and transitory pressures? My research and writings convince me otherwise. The central themes of the annual reports are consistent and reach back to Clinton’s December 1991 address at Georgetown University. The belief that foreign and domestic agendas could be combined for the good of the nation was a revolutionary concept and one that appalled those who held their faith in classic power politics. But Clinton was governing his nation through a new age that called for new concepts. His guiding mantra had been Franklin Roosevelt’s desire for “bold, persistent experimentation,”[58] and in the policy of engagement and enlargement, he found a way to actively engage in such an activist approach to policy. 

In his first year, “Clinton could not summon the fascination with foreign affairs that gripped him as he sat for hours discussing domestic matters,”[59] and critics such as William G. Hyland berated Clinton for not doing more with his Presidency. Yet it is important to consider a more conciliatory view. In a world where the old rules did not apply, American foreign policy needed to adapt quickly and its domestic stagnation was a severe handicap to its capacity to do so. If the economy had been less of an issue, Clinton may have been able to take a more active stance in leading a new international community. However, when President Clinton came to office, there was also no framework in place to rival the Containment policy of the Cold War and the New World Order had not materialised. The American people were looking for a reduced role in the world and sought domestic renewal over international leadership. Also, with no military experience, it is easy to imagine how President Clinton could have rushed into combat. As Colonel Dewar of the In­ternational Institute for Strategic Studies stated, “You could pat the president on the back for not falling into the trap of some ridiculous vi­rility test, some measurement of macho.” [60]

Despite the benefits of the policy however, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the document failed to have the impact that had originally been intended by the administration. Despite the initial expectations for the document and the policies it espoused it appears that over time the importance of the annual document subsided in the eyes of the administration to a point where it became a bureaucratic devise, rather than an important tool of policy planning. Clearly Engagement and Enlargement was an imperfect policy, and one that failed to ignite public interest. But in an age when the old rules did not apply and no New World Order had emerged, this policy, established within the first eighteen months of the administration, provided a flexible response to an ever-changing world.